

## **INTS 2703: Nuclear Weapons and International Security**

**Fall 2018**

**Sié Complex 2115**

**Monday, Wednesday: 10-11:50am**

**Faculty Instructor:** Assistant Professor Julia Macdonald

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**Office Hours:** Mondays 1-3pm. Sign up at <https://juliamacdonald.youcanbook.me/>

**Teaching Assistant:** Sooyeon Kang

**Contact Information:** [Sooyeon.Kang@du.edu](mailto:Sooyeon.Kang@du.edu)

### **Course Description**

This course analyzes the role of nuclear weapons in international politics. The course addresses the origins of the atomic bomb project, early efforts to control nuclear materials, deterrence theory, nuclear strategy and force posture, and considers contemporary challenges to the global nuclear order, including nuclear latency and nuclear terrorism.

The course will start with the initial development and use of nuclear weapons, followed by an in-depth look at the early thinking on nuclear strategy and escalation during the Cold War. These classes will cover the Manhattan Project, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the basics of deterrence theory, the arms race between the United States and Soviet Union, and historical cases of nuclear crises and brinkmanship.

During weeks 5-7 students will explore the politics of nuclear acquisition, evaluating different explanations for why states build nuclear weapons. During these classes, we will also examine the ways in which the international community has sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, including the important role of international institutions, norms, and the nuclear disarmament movement.

The final section of the course will be devoted to contemporary topics in nuclear politics, including the threat of nuclear terrorism, nuclear energy and dual-use issues, regional instability in Northeast and South Asia, the Iran nuclear deal, and the implication of new technologies (autonomous systems, 3D printing, precision weapons) for international security.

Each week will include a lecture covering key insights from the readings, student-led discussion and class exercises. A number of expert guest speakers will be featured throughout the quarter.

### **Learning Objectives**

The objective of the class is to help students understand how the rise and spread of nuclear weapons has changed the face of international politics.

By the end of the quarter, each student will:

- 1) Have improved their understanding of international nuclear history;

- 2) Understand why some countries have sought nuclear weapons while others have not;
- 3) Understand the key debates surrounding the political effects of nuclear proliferation;
- 4) Be aware of the policy tools that governments and international organizations have created and used to limit the spread of nuclear weapons;
- 5) Be able to assess the most significant contemporary nuclear challenges;
- 6) And have improved their written and verbal analytical reasoning skills.

### **Course Requirements**

- **Class Participation and Attendance** (15%). Students should come to class prepared to discuss the assigned readings and material from lectures, and ready to participate in all activities. Quality of participation, rather than quantity, counts.
- **Discussion Leading** (15%) During the first week of class, students will sign up to join a discussion group for a designated week of the quarter. These discussion groups will meet ahead of their assigned class to answer three questions about the week's readings: 1) What are the most important themes from the week's readings? 2) Which arguments did you find most convincing and why? Which did you find the least compelling? 3) What questions did the readings raise that you felt were left unanswered? During the second half of the assigned class, the group will be called upon to give a 10-15 minute presentation of their thoughts. This presentation should not simply be a summary of the readings, but rather a thoughtful reflection on the topics raised.
- **Midterm Policy Paper** (25%). Each student will write a 5-7 page policy paper which showcases their comprehension of material from the first half of the course. The paper topic will be distributed in Week 5 and is due at the beginning of Week 6. Detailed guidelines will be provided early in the semester.
- **Final Take Home Exam** (45%). A final take home exam will be distributed after class on November 14 and due by 5pm on November 19. The exam will feature one essay question based on the class material, and answers should not exceed 10 pages. More detail on the final exam will be provided throughout the quarter.

**Note:** All written work should be uploaded in Canvas by the date and time specified. Papers and final exams should be double spaced, in 12-point font, with standard margins. Citations should follow the Chicago Manual of Style guidelines which are available online.

### **Required Texts and Readings**

Course readings will be placed on reserve at the library or be available via Canvas. For those who wish to purchase copies of assigned books, most editions are acceptable for this class.

### **Expectations and Etiquette**

In general, each class will open with a short 5-10-minute session where students will have an opportunity to ask questions or discuss contemporary events as they relate to course themes. This discussion will be followed by a 50-minute lecture and then a 5-minute break. The second half of the class will involve a discussion of the week's readings, student presentations, and interactive activities based on that week's themes.

There are no course prerequisites but students are expected to stay informed of current events through major news outlets such as the *New York Times*, and *The Washington Post*. In addition to

following current events, there are a number of policy outlets that regularly publish on international security issues including *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *The National Interest*, and *War on the Rocks*.

Passive learning is not an option in this class. Not only is class participation a formal part of each student's grade, but it is necessary for everyone to get the most out of this course. As such, I expect everyone to do the reading ahead of class and to come prepared to discuss the assigned material.

Finally, the classroom is a place to express intellectual curiosity and to explore ideas as they relate to the world around us – it is meant to be a safe place for everyone. To protect this environment, I will not tolerate any form of bigotry, discrimination, hateful rhetoric, or hateful action.

### **Cell Phone and Computer Policy**

Cell phones should be placed out of sight for the duration of the class. Students are allowed to use laptops and tablets for note-taking *only*. It is very obvious when students are distracted by other activities, and if students are caught abusing this privilege they will lose the ability to use their devices in class.

### **Honor Code**

All students are expected to abide by the [University of Denver Honor Code](#). These expectations include the application of academic integrity and honesty in your class participation and assignments.

### **Students with Disabilities**

If you have a disability/medical issue protected under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and need to request accommodation, please visit the Disability Services Program [website](#) or visit the offices on the 4<sup>th</sup> floor of Ruffatto Hall, 1999 Evans Ave., Denver, CO.

### **Additional Information**

The University of Denver provides numerous services to students to help improve writing, quantitative skills, and professional development. The Writing Center can be an invaluable resource for students who need help in this area. Please see the Writing Center's [website](#) for more information.

### **Course Schedule**

| <b>Week</b>                    | <b>Topic</b>                                       | <b>Date</b>          |
|--------------------------------|--|----------------------|
| <b>Part I: The Early Years</b> |  |                      |
| <b>1.</b>                      | Introduction & The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb | Week of September 10 |
| <b>2.</b>                      | Effects of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict             | Week of September 17 |
| <b>3.</b>                      | Nuclear Arms Races & Cold War Crises               | Week of September 24 |

|   |  |                     |
|---|--|---------------------|
| 4.  | Nuclear Force Development and Posture  | Week of October 1   |
| <b>Part II: Nuclear Proliferation and Non-Proliferation</b> |  |                     |
| 5.  | Nuclear Motives<br><i>Policy Paper Topic Distributed</i>   | Week of October 8   |
| 6.  | Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Institutions, Coercion, and Preventive Force<br><i>Policy Paper Due</i> | Week of October 15  |
| 7.  | Nuclear Non-Use and the Drive for Global Zero  | Week of October 22  |
| <b>Part III: Contemporary Issues</b>                        |  |                     |
| 8.  | Nuclear Latency, Dual-Use Issues, and New Technologies   | Week of October 29  |
| 9.  | New Nuclear Threats: State and Non-State Actors  | Week of November 5  |
| 10.   | The New Nuclear Revolution: Rethinking Conventional Wisdoms<br><i>Final Exam Distributed</i>       | Week of November 12 |

### Course Readings

*Academic articles and book chapters are available on Canvas under the modules tab. Books have also been placed on reserve at the library. Op-eds and policy papers can be found online. Please let Sooyeon know if you have trouble locating any of the week's assigned readings.*

#### **Part I: The Early Years**

##### **Week 1: Introduction & The Decision to Build and Use the Atomic Bomb**

###### Sept 10: Introduction

Joseph Cirincione, *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 84-109

Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", *Federation of American Scientists*, June 2018: <https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/>

Paul Sonne, "Pentagon Unveils New Nuclear Weapons Strategy, Ending Obama-era Push to Reduce U.S. Arsenal," *The Washington Post*, February 2, 2018

###### Sept 12: The Decision to Build and Use the Atomic Bomb

Joseph Cirincione et al, *Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear Biological and Chemical Threats* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington D.C., 2005), pp. 45-55.

Joseph Cirincione, *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp.1-20.

Read some of: John Hersey, "Hiroshima," *The New Yorker*, August 31, 1946:  
<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1946/08/31/hiroshima?intcid=mod-most-popular>

*Optional further reading:*

Matthew Bunn, "Nuclear 101: How Nuclear Weapons Work"  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zVhQOhxb1Mc>

Ward Wilson, "The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima," *International Security*, vol. 31, no. 4 (2007): 162–179.

Richard Rhodes, *The Making of the Atomic Bomb* (New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster), Chapter 19.

Gar Alperovitz. "Hiroshima: Historians Reassess," *Foreign Policy*, 99 (1995): 15–34

Primary documents regarding the decision to use the bomb are available at the National Security Archives: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/>

For more on the scholarly debate regarding the decision to use the bomb, see <http://www.doug-long.com/debate.htm>

## **Week 2: Effects of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict**

Sept 17: *The Nuclear Revolution*

### **GUEST SPEAKER: Professor Mark Bell, University of Minnesota**

Kenneth N. Waltz, "More May Be Better," in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (2003): 3–37.

Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 92–125.

Michael Krepon, "The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia," *The Stimson Center*, January 1 2005: <https://www.stimson.org/content/stability-instability-paradox-south-asia>

*Optional further reading:*

Robert Jervis, "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," *Political Science Quarterly*, 94, 4 (1979–1980): 617-633.

Sept 19: *Criticisms of the Nuclear Revolution*

Scott D. Sagan, "More Will Be Worse," in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (2003): 46-87.

Mark S. Bell, "Nuclear Opportunism: A Theory of How States Use Nuclear Weapons in International Politics," *Journal of Strategic Studies*. Published online 28 November, 2017, pp.1-8.

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence," *International Security*, vol. 41, no. 4 (2017): 9-13, 16-18, 48-49.

### **Week 3: Nuclear Arms Races and Cold War Crises**

#### Sept 24: Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War

David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 294-319.

Joseph Cirincione, *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp.21-46

#### *Optional further reading:*

David Hoffman, *The Dead Hand* (New York: Anchor Press, 2010), pp.6-11, 27-59

#### Sept 26: Cold War Crises

Robert S. McNamara, "Forty Years After 13 Days," *Arms Control Today*, November 2002.  
[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002\\_11/cubanmissile](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_11/cubanmissile)

Marc Trachtenberg, "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Security*, vol. 10, no. 1 (1985): 137–163.

Richard Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Brookings Institute Press, Washington D.C., 1987), pp. 23-31, 62-66, 79-81, 83-92.

#### *Optional further reading:*

Rosemary Foot, "Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict," *International Security* vol. 13, no. 3 (1988–1989): 92–112.

### **Week 4: Nuclear Force Development and Posture**

#### Oct 1: United States and the Soviet Union

#### **GUEST SPEAKER: Professor Frank Gavin, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University**

Scott D. Sagan, *Moving Targets* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), Chapter 1.

Zachary Keck, "The Soviet Union's Insane Plan to Crush NATO in Battle," *The National Interest*, July 17, 2015: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-soviet-unions-insane-plan-crush-nato-battle-13355>

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 2 (March-April 2006): 42–54.

*Optional further reading:*

Scott D. Sagan, "The Case for No First Use," *Survival*, 51, 3 (2009): 163–182.

Oct 3: Extended Deterrence and Regional Nuclear Powers

John J. Mearsheimer, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe," *International Security* 9, 3 (1984-85): 20-26.

S. Paul Kapur, "India and Pakistan's Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia is Not Like Cold War Europe," *International Security* vol. 30, no. 2 (2005): 132–152.

Vipin Narang, "Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Implications for South Asian Stability," Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010:  
<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/pakistans-nuclear-posture-implications-south-asian-stability>

Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, "Why China Won't Abandon its Nuclear Strategy of Assured Retaliation," Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, December 2015: <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-china-wont-abandon-its-nuclear-strategy-assured-retaliation>

*Optional further reading:*

Vipin Narang, "Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Security," *International Security*, vol. 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009-2010): 38–78.

Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, "Assuring Assured Retaliation: China's Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability," *International Security*, vol. 40, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 7-50.

## **Week 5: Nuclear Motives**

Oct 8: Nuclear Proliferation: Demand and Supply

Sagan, Scott D. "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb", *International Security*, 21, 3 (1996-1997): 54-86.

Jacques Hymans, "Isotopes and Identity: Australia and the Nuclear Weapons Option, 1949-1999," *Nonproliferation Review*, 7, 1 (2000): 1–23.

*Optional further reading:*

Matthew Fuhrmann, "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," *International Security*, 34, 1 (2009): 7–41.

Matthew Kroenig, "Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance," *American Political Science Review* 103, 1 (2009): especially 113-17, 126-28.

Oct 10: Nuclear Restraint and Nuclear Reversal

J. W. de Villiers, Roger Jardine, Mitchell Reiss, “Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, 72, 5 (1993): 98-109.

John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent,” *Foreign Affairs* 72, 3 (1993): 50-66.

Ariel Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” *International Security*, Vol 27, No. 3 (2002/2003): 59-75.

*Optional further reading:*

Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” *International Security* 19, No. 2 (1994): 126-169.

**Note: Policy Paper Topic Distributed After Class**

**Week 6: Nuclear Non-Proliferation – Institutes, Coercion, and Preventive Force**

Oct 15: The NPT and Arms Control

**GUEST SPEAKER: Rebecca Hersman, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues, CSIS**

“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”

<https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/>

Joseph Cirincione et al, *Deadly Arsenal: Nuclear Biological and Chemical Threats* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington D.C., 2005), pp. 27-43.

George Bunn. “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems,” *Arms Control Today* (December 2003): [https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003\\_12/Bunn](https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Bunn)

*Optional further reading:*

Andrew Coe and Jane Vaynman, “Collusion and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” *Journal of Politics*, 77, 4 (2015): 983-997.

**Note: Policy Paper Due**

Oct 17: Coercion and Preventive Force

Nicholas Miller, “U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy is an Invisible Success Story,” *Washington Post Monkey Cage* blog, October 16, 2014 (available online).

Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks,” *International Security* 36, 1 (2011): 101-132.

Matthew Fuhrmann, “Preventive War and the Spread of Nuclear Programs,” NonProliferation Policy Education Center, June 28, 2012: <http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1188&rid=4>

*Optional further reading:*



Gene Gerzhoy, "Alliance Coercion and Nuclear Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West Germany's Nuclear Ambitions," *International Security*, 39, 4 (Spring 2015): 91-129.

### **Week 7: Nuclear Non-Use and the Drive for Global Zero**

Oct 22: *Nuclear Norms: Taboos and Nuclear Acceptance*

#### **GUEST SPEAKER: Professor Nina Tannenwald, Brown University**

Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," *International Organization*, 53, 3 (Summer 1999): 433-442.

Nina Tannenwald, "How Strong Is the Nuclear Taboo Today?" *The Washington Quarterly* 41, 3 (2018): 89-109 (pdf. in Files > Additional Readings on Canvas).

Daryl Press, Scott Sagan, and Ben Valentino, "Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons," *American Political Science Review*, 107, 1 (2013): 190-200.

Fred Kaplan, "The Real Nuclear Option," *Slate.com*, August 14, 2017:

[http://www.slate.com/articles/news\\_and\\_politics/war\\_stories/2017/08/sagan\\_and\\_valentino\\_study\\_shows\\_americans\\_would\\_likely\\_support\\_nuclear\\_first.html](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2017/08/sagan_and_valentino_study_shows_americans_would_likely_support_nuclear_first.html)

*Optional further reading:*

Carol Cohn, "The Perils of Mixing Masculinity and Missiles," *New York Times*, January 5, 2018 (pdf. in Files > Additional Readings on Canvas)

Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino, "Revisiting Hiroshima in Iran: What Americans Really Think about Using Nuclear Weapons and Killing Noncombatants," *International Security*, 42, 1 (Summer 2017): 41-79.

Carol Cohn, "Slick 'Ems, Glick 'Ems, Christmas Trees, and Cookie Cutters: Nuclear Language and How We Learned to Pat the Bomb," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (June 1987): 17-24.

Oct 24: *The Drive for Global Zero*

George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," *Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 2007.

Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, "The Logic of Zero: Toward a World without Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Affairs* (Nov/Dec 2008): 80-95.

Kenneth Waltz and Scott Sagan, "The Great Debate: Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?" *The National Interest*, 109 (September/October 2010): 88-96.

*Optional further reading:*

Charles L. Glaser, "The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament," *Survival*, 40, 1 (1998): 112-128.

## **Week 8: Nuclear Latency & Dual-Use Issues**

Oct 29: Nuclear Latency

### **GUEST SPEAKER: Professor Tristan Volpe, Naval Postgraduate School**

Scott D. Sagan, "Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation," in *Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 1, The Role of Theory*, eds. William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), pp.80-101.

Tristan Volpe, "Atomic Leverage: Compellence with Nuclear Latency," *Security Studies*, 26, 3 (2017): 517-520, 532-540.

James M. Acton, "Wagging the Plutonium Dog: Japanese Domestic Politics and Its International Security Implications," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2015:  
[http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Brief-Plutonium\\_Dog.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Brief-Plutonium_Dog.pdf)

*Optional further reading:*

Matthew Fuhrmann, "The Logic of Latent Nuclear Deterrence," September 8, 2017. Working paper: [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=3052231](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3052231)

Oct 31: New Technologies and Dual Use Issues

John P. Holdren, "Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Connection is Dangerous," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 39, 1 (1983): 40–45.

Bernard I. Spinrad, "Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Connection is Tenuous," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 39, 2 (1983): 42–47.

Tristan Volpe and Matthew Kroenig, "3-D Printing the Bomb? The Nuclear Non-proliferation Challenge," *The Washington Quarterly*, 38, 3 (2015): 7-19.

Nicholas L. Miller, "Nuclear Energy and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: How Worried Should We Be?" Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, November 2017:  
<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-energy-and-spread-nuclear-weapons-how-worried-should-we-be>

*Optional further reading:*

Nicholas L. Miller, "Why Nuclear Energy Rarely Leads to Proliferation," *International Security*, 42, 2 (2017): 40–77.

## **Week 9: New Nuclear Threats: State and Non-State Actors**

Nov 5: NSAs: Terrorism and Illicit Networks

Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," *International Security* 29, 2 (2004): 5–49.

John Mueller, *Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 161-198

*Optional further reading:*

Graham Allison, "How to Stop Nuclear Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 83, No. 1 (2004): 64-74.

Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, "Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism," *Current History*, 104, 681 (2005): 153–161.

Sheena Chestnut, "Illicit Activity and Proliferation: North Korean Smuggling Networks," *International Security* 32, 1 (2007): 80-111.

Nov 7: New State Threats

**GUEST SPEAKER: Dr. Colin Kahl, Stanford University**

*Iran:*

Colin H. Kahl, "Pompeo's Dangerous Delusions," *Foreign Affairs*, October 24, 2018. Pdf. in Files > Additional Reading on Canvas.

Michael R. Pompeo, "Confronting Iran: The Trump Administration's Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 97, 6 (November/December 2018). Pdf. in Files > Additional Reading on Canvas.

Nicholas L. Miller and Or Rabinowitz, "Why the Iran Deal is a Logical Extension of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy," *Washington Post* Monkey Cage blog, April 21, 2015.

Elizabeth Saunders, "President Trump Pulled the U.S. Out of the Iran Deal. Here is What You Need to Know," *Washington Post* Monkey Cage blog, May 9, 2018.

*North Korea:*

Van Jackson, "Threat Consensus and Rapprochement Failure: Revisiting the Collapse of US-North Korea Relations, 1994-2002," *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 14, 2 (2018): especially 241-250.

Vipin Narang, "Why Kim Jong Un Wouldn't Be Irrational to Use a Nuclear Bomb First," *Washington Post*, September 8, 2017.

John Bolton, "The Legal Case for Striking North Korea First," *Wall Street Journal*, February 28, 2018.

Jeffrey Lewis, "The Word That Could Help the World Avoid Nuclear War," *New York Times*, April 4, 2018.

**Week 10: The New Nuclear Revolution: Rethinking Conventional Wisdoms and Future Threats**

Nov 12: Reconsidering Old Debates

Nicholas Miller and Vipin Narang, "How North Korea Shocked the Nuclear Experts," *Politico*, August 26, 2017.

Olga Oliker, "Moscow's Nuclear Enigma: What Is Russia's Arsenal Really For?" *Foreign Affairs* 97, 6 (November/December 2018). Pdf. in Files > Additional Reading on Canvas.

*Optional further reading:*

Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, "Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 38, 1-2 (2015): 38-73.

Frank J. Gavin, "Strategies of Inhibition," U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation," *International Security*, 40, 1 (2015): 9-46.

Nov 14: *Looking to the Future*

Paul Sonne, "Trump Poised to Get New Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons," *Washington Post*, June 13, 2018.

Nicholas Miller and Tristan Volpe, "Abstinence or Tolerance: Managing Ambitions in Saudi Arabia," *The Washington Quarterly*, 41, 2 (2018): 27-46.

Page Stoutland, "Growing Threat: Cyber and Nuclear Weapons Systems," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 18 October 2017.

Caitlin Talmadge, "Beijing's Nuclear Option: Why A U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control," *Foreign Affairs* 97, 6 (November/December 2018). Pdf. in Files > Additional Reading on Canvas.

*Optional further reading:*

Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, "Thermonuclear Cyberwar," *Journal of Cybersecurity*, 3, 1 (2017): 37-48.

Caitlin Talmadge, "Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States," *International Security*, 41, 4 (2017): 50-92.

***Note: Final Exam Distributed After Class***