
Decision Making in Nuclear Crises

Fall 2018
(Poli Sci 601)

Professor Jonathan Renshon

✉: renshon@wisc.edu

Office location: North Hall 409

Office hours: Tuesdays (11-noon) via UW Schedule Assistant

Tuesday/Thursday

9:30-10:45

VAN VLECK B135

1 Course Description

“Decision Making in Nuclear Crises” draws on insights from political science, international history and public policy as well as related fields in the behavioral sciences insofar as they bear on judgment and decision-making. The course will be structured around different sets of decisions that political leaders face, such as the decision about whether to pursue nuclear weapons, how to make judgments about intelligence on the weapons programs of other countries, how and when to limit armaments, behavior during nuclear crises and whether and how to address proliferation. It will culminate in a multi-day simulation of a nuclear crisis.

Learning Outcomes: This is a three credit course. This course is a traditional course according to the Carnegie definition (i.e. at least 1 hour of classroom instruction and 2 hours of out-of-class student work each week). Students who closely and carefully engage course readings, attend and participate in class discussion, and complete course assignments will be able to:

- Explain arguments for and against the utility of nuclear weapons and their proliferation
- Examine and assess the strengths/weaknesses of theories of nuclear weapons and political decision-making
- Apply course concepts to contemporary debates about nuclear weapons and foreign policy
- Plan, conduct research for and write a term paper
- Dissent respectfully

2 Policies

- I expect you to complete the readings assigned for each week prior to our class meeting, to take notes on your readings and to actively participate in our seminar discussion. Active participation requires you bring the relevant readings to class each day (which may mean printing them beforehand) and that you respectfully engage with both the course content and your peers’ contributions.

- I agree entirely with the University’s institutional statement on inclusion and diversity, and value the contributions of each person and respect the ways their identity, culture, background, experience, status, abilities, and opinion enrich our intellectual community <https://diversity.wisc.edu>.
- You will need to complete your assignments on time, as I will accept no late work without an approved accommodation prior to the due date.
- Accommodations will be made for those students who have documented proof of an emergency or those students who have documented evidence of learning disabilities. I am firmly committed to ensuring equal learning access for all and therefore encourage individuals with disabilities to participate in the McBurney Center’s available programs and activities. If you need an accommodation, you must contact the center at (608) 263-2741 or email them at mcburney@studentlife.wisc.edu to obtain documentation for your specific needs. You must do so by the end of Week 2 and you must contact me in advance to make appropriate arrangements for papers, etc.
- NO LAPTOPS IN CLASS. There is an overwhelming amount of research showing that students take better notes when they do it by hand, and learn more overall when they don’t have their computers open. If you have a medical or other legitimate need for a laptop, please let me know.
- If you have any questions about anything related to the course, email me and I will do my best to get back to you within 24 hours.
→ One exception: I will not respond to emails sent the night before an assignment is due or before a midterm or final exam.
- Finally, I strictly adhere to the UW Academic Misconduct Process and will report all incidents of academic misconduct the Dean of Students Office, as it is a prerequisite for maintaining academic integrity in our course.

3 Assignments & Grading

- 20% – Attendance/Participation
→ I expect you to attend all of the sessions of the course and contribute to discussion.
- 10% – Simulation (will discuss in detail in class)
- 40% – Recurring Assignments
 - 10% – Discussion questions

You will submit a discussion question prior to each class (with a few exceptions) via Canvas. Questions can be focused on one particular reading or making connections across readings and are due no later than 5:00pm *the day before class* (so, on Mondays and Wednesdays). I will not evaluate the content of these questions, but they should either be a clarification question or a substantive question on the assigned readings that you think would be useful to discuss in class. The discussion leader will also use these questions as they prepare comments for our seminar.

⇒ Due day before each class by 5:00pm.

- 15% – Guiding class discussion (7.5% each × 2)
 - You will lead the discussion (along with a classmate) two times. This involves doing all the readings carefully, preparing questions and topics and getting our discussion going in class. It will also require coordinating with the other student(s) signed up for that week to think about how you'd like to focus class discussion.
 - Please email me your outline for class discussion the night before class. Sign up here.

- 15% – Response paper (7.5% each × 2)
 - Every time you lead class discussion, you will also write a short response paper (due any time before class starts that day). Response papers are to address the day's reading; you can compare and contrast readings, pick one and analyze it in detail, examine either the arguments (theory) or evidence, or the fit between them. There are lots of options. *Response papers should never just summarize the readings.* They should be between 600-800 words (or the equivalent of three pages double-spaced).

- 30% – Final research paper (10-15 pages)

→ The final project for this class is a research paper of between 6000-8000 words (not including bibliography). Any topics we cover in class is fair game, but the paper must address a question or issue that we discuss. I suggest simply starting with the title of each class or unit for some clues about what kinds of topics are out there and then think about what you are most interested in writing about. For example, a paper might address the question “Do nuclear weapons deter?” It might also take its cue from the class on “The Psychology of Deterrence and make an argument about how psychology affects deterrence in some way. The paper *must* consider a case in light of the argument you are making. If, for example, you are working on deterrence and nuclear weapons, you must use a case study to make your argument (for example, a case study of a specific crisis or war).

(i) Sign up for at least one appointment at office hours to discuss your paper (but feel free to sign up for more!). It is highly recommended that you bring an outline of your paper idea to the appointment.

(ii) Turn in a 1 page overview that I will provide feedback on.

(iii) Write the actual paper!

⇒ 1 page overview due **Tuesday, October 30th**

⇒ Paper due **Thursday, December 13th**

4 Required Readings

Journal articles and edited book chapters - Available through the UW Library website. Another, easier way access them is to use scholar.google.com. The first time you use it, click on

“Settings,” then “Library Links” and choose UW-Madison. Every time you look up an article title after that, it will provide you a direct link to download that article. Anything not accessible through these sources will have a link next to it on the syllabus to enable you to download a scanned copy (email me if there are problems!).

5 Overview of Schedule

Week 1: Intro

Week 2: Why Do States Pursue Nuclear Weapons?

Week 3: The Use of the Bomb in WWII

Week 4: U.S. Nuclear Strategy in the 1950s

Week 5: Nuclear Deterrence

Week 6: Is More Better?

Week 7: Nuclear Crises

Week 8: Proliferation

Week 9: Nuclear Latency/Norms & Ethics

Week 10: Nuclear Terrorism

Week 11: Global Zero/Current U.S. Strategy

Week 12: Simulation

Week 13: Simulation

Week 14: Guest Lectures

Schedule

1. Why Study Nuclear Weapons? [Thursday, September 6th]

- Younger, S. M. (2009). *The Bomb: A New History*. Harper Collins, chapter 1. Access here.
- Cirincione, J. (2008). *Bomb scare: the history and future of nuclear weapons*. Columbia University Press, New York, NY, chapter 1. Access here.
- SKIM Rotter, A. J. (2008). *Hiroshima: the world's bomb*. Oxford University Press, chapter 4. Access here.

Optional Readings:

- Atomic Archives. 2008. "The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb. Access here.
 - Mandelbaum, M. (1980). The bomb, dread, and eternity. *International Security*, 5(2):3–23
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2. Why do states pursue nuclear weapons? I [Tuesday, September 11th]

- Sagan, S. (1996). Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb. *International Security*, 21(3):54–86
- Monteiro, N. P. and Debs, A. (2014). The strategic logic of nuclear proliferation. *International Security*, 39(2):7–51
- Montgomery, A. H. and Sagan, S. D. (2009). The perils of predicting proliferation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(2):302–328

Optional Readings:

- Singh, S. and Way, C. R. (2004). The correlates of nuclear proliferation: A quantitative test. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(6):859–885
 - Sagan, S. D. (1997). The causes of nuclear proliferation. *Current History*, 96(609):151
 - Ogilvie-White, T. (1996). Is there a theory of nuclear proliferation? an analysis of the contemporary debate. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 4(1):43–60
 - Bell, M. S. (2015). Examining explanations for nuclear proliferation. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(3):520–529
 - Cirincione, J. (2008). *Bomb scare: the history and future of nuclear weapons*. Columbia University Press, New York, NY, chapter 2. Access here.
 - Solingen, E. (2009). *Nuclear logics: contrasting paths in East Asia and the Middle East*. Princeton University Press, chapters 1 and 2.
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3. Why do states pursue nuclear weapons? II (Status and Identity)
[Thursday, September 13th]

- Hymans, J. E. (2000). Isotopes and identity: Australia and the nuclear weapons option, 1949–1999. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 7(1):1–23
- O’Neill, B. (2006). Nuclear weapons and national prestige. Access here.
- Mueller, J. (2009). *Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda*. Oxford University Press, chapter 8 (The Limited Appeal and Value of Nuclear Weapons). Available here.

Optional Readings:

- Fuhrmann, M. and Horowitz, M. C. (2014). When leaders matter: Rebel experience and nuclear proliferation. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(1):72–87
 - Hymans, J. E. (2001). Of gauchos and gringos: Why argentina never wanted the bomb, and why the united states thought it did. *Security Studies*, 10(3):153–185
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4. The Use of the Bomb in WWII: stress, overconfidence, etc.
[Tuesday, September 18th]

- Johnson, D., McDermott, R., Barrett, E., Cowden, J., Wrangham, R., McIntyre, M., and Rosen, S. (2006). Overconfidence in wargames: experimental evidence on expectations, aggression, gender and testosterone. *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, 273(1600):2513–2520
 - Johnson, D. D. and Tierney, D. (2011). The rubicon theory of war: how the path to conflict reaches the point of no return. *International Security*, 36(1):7–40
 - Rosen, S. P. (2007). *War and human nature*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, chapter 4. Available here.
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5. The Use of the Bomb in WWII
[Thursday, September 20th]

- Bernstein, B. J. (1991). Eclipsed by hiroshima and nagasaki: Early thinking about tactical nuclear weapons. *International Security*, 15(4):149–173
- Wilson, W. (2007). The winning weapon? rethinking nuclear weapons in light of hiroshima. *International Security*, 31(4):162–179
- Walker, J. S. (2005). Recent literature on truman’s atomic bomb decision: a search for middle ground. *Diplomatic History*, 29(2):311–334

Optional Readings:

- Miles Jr, R. E. (1985). Hiroshima: The strange myth of half a million american lives saved. *International Security*, 10(2):121–140

- Alperovitz, G. (1995). Hiroshima: Historians reassess. *Foreign Policy*, (99):15–34
- Hersman, Rebecca. “When Should the President Use Nuclear Weapons?” War on the Rocks, August 14, 2017
- John Hersey, “Hiroshima,” *The New Yorker*, July 31, 1946, pp. 15-68.
- Bernstein, B. J. (1995a). The atomic bombings reconsidered. *Foreign Aff.*, 74:135
- Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb, 712-747
- Scott D. Sagan and Benjamin A. Valentino (2016) Would the U.S. Drop the Bomb Again? *Wall Street Journal*. May, 4
- Bernstein, B. J. (1995b). Understanding the atomic bomb and the Japanese surrender: Missed opportunities, little-known near disasters, and modern memory. *Diplomatic History*, 19(2):227–273

6. What was U.S. Nuclear Strategy in the 1950s?

[**Tuesday, September 25th**]

- Trachtenberg, M. (1988). A “wasting asset”: American strategy and the shifting nuclear balance, 1949-1954. *International Security*, 13(3):5–49
- Rosenberg, D. A. (1983). The origins of overkill: Nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945-1960. *International Security*, 7(4):3–71
- Evangelista, M. (1990). Cooperation theory and disarmament negotiations in the 1950s. *World Politics*, 42(4):502–528

Optional Readings:

- Wohlstetter, A. (1959). The delicate balance of terror: Condensed from foreign affairs January, 1959. *Survival*, 1(1):8–17
- Gavin, F. J. (2012). *Nuclear statecraft: history and strategy in America’s atomic age*. Cornell University Press, chapter 2. Available here.
- Younger, S. M. (2009). *The Bomb: A New History*. Harper Collins, chapter 2 (A Short History of Nuclear Weapons). Available here.

7. NO CLASS MEETING (Watch Dr. Strangelove)

[**Thursday, September 27th**]

- Eric Schlosser, “Almost Everything in Dr. Strangelove was True,” *New Yorker*, January 17, 2014.

8. The Psychology of deterrence

[**Tuesday, October 2nd**]

- Schelling, T. (1966). *Arms and influence*. Yale University press, New Haven, CT, chapter 2. Available here.
 - Jervis, R., Lebow, R. N., and Stein, J. G. (1989). *Psychology and deterrence*. Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington, D.C, chapter 1-4. Available here.
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9. Do Nukes Deter?

[Thursday, October 4th]

- Glaser, C. (1989). Why do strategists disagree about the requirements of strategic nuclear deterrence? *Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates*, pages 109–71
- Narang, V. (2013). What does it take to deter? regional power nuclear postures and international conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57(3):478–508
- Adamsky, D. D. (2013). The 1983 nuclear crisis—lessons for deterrence theory and practice. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 36(1):4–41

Optional Readings:

- Mueller, J. (2009). *Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda*. Oxford University Press, chapter 3 (Deterring World War III: Essential Irrelevance). Available here.
 - Lewis, J. (2008). Minimum deterrence. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 64(3):38–41
 - Lieber, K. A. and Press, D. G. (2017). The new era of counterforce: technological change and the future of nuclear deterrence. *International Security*, 41(4):9–49
 - Lebow, R. N. and Stein, J. G. (1995). Deterrence and the cold war. *Political Science Quarterly*, 110(2):157–181
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10. Is More Better? I

[Tuesday, October 9th]

- Sagan, S. D. and Waltz, K. N. (2013). *The spread of nuclear weapons: an enduring debate*. WW Norton New York. Available here
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11. Is More Better? II: Do nukes help states “get their way in international politics?”

[Thursday, October 11th]

- Kroenig, M. (2013). Nuclear superiority and the balance of resolve: Explaining nuclear crisis outcomes. *International Organization*, 67(1):141–171
- Mueller, J. (1988). The essential irrelevance of nuclear weapons: Stability in the postwar world. *International Security*, 13(2):55–79

- Sechser, T. S. and Fuhrmann, M. (2017). *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge University Press, chapters 5 & 6. Available here.

Optional Readings:

- Powell, R. (2003). Nuclear deterrence theory, nuclear proliferation, and national missile defense. *International Security*, 27(4):86–118 (ignore technical parts of game theory model)
- Beardsley, K. and Asal, V. (2009). Winning with the bomb. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(2):278–301

12. What (if anything) is different about nuclear crises? I (crisis decisionmaking, fear)
[**Tuesday, October 16th**]

- Geva, N. and Skorick, J. M. (2006). The emotional calculus of foreign policy decisions: Getting emotions out of the closet. In Redlawsk, D. P., editor, *Feeling Politics*, pages 209–226. Springer Available here.
- Druckman, J. N. and McDermott, R. (2008). Emotion and the framing of risky choice. *Political Behavior*, 30(3):297–321
- Bar-Joseph, U. and McDermott, R. (2008). Personal functioning under stress: Accountability and social support of israeli leaders in the yom kippur war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(1):144–170

13. What (if anything) is different about nuclear crises? II
[**Thursday, October 18th**]

- Trachtenberg, M. (1985). The influence of nuclear weapons in the cuban missile crisis. *International Security*, 10(1):137–163
- Gavin, F. J. (2012). *Nuclear statecraft: history and strategy in America's atomic age*. Cornell University Press, chapter 3. Available here.
- Foot, R. J. (1988). Nuclear coercion and the ending of the korean conflict. *International Security*, 13(3):92–112

14. Approaches to Non-Proliferation I: Arms Control Agreements
Guest instructor: Professor Andrew Kydd
[**Tuesday, October 23rd**]

- Bunn, G. (2003). The nuclear nonproliferation treaty: History and current problems. *Arms Control Today*, 33(10):4–10
- Coe, A. J. and Vaynman, J. (2015). Collusion and the nuclear nonproliferation regime. *The Journal of Politics*, 77(4):983–997

- Fuhrmann, M. (2009). Spreading temptation: proliferation and peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements. *International security*, 34(1):7–41

Optional Readings:

- Gerzhoy, G. (2015). Alliance coercion and nuclear restraint: how the united states thwarted west germany’s nuclear ambitions. *International Security*, 39(4):91–129
- Kemp, R. S. (2014). The nonproliferation emperor has no clothes: the gas centrifuge, supply-side controls, and the future of nuclear proliferation. *International Security*, 38(4):39–78
- Davis-Gibbons, Rebecca. “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: How Did We Get Here and What Does it Mean for the United States?” July 14, 2017. War on the Rocks.

15. Approaches to Non-Proliferation II: “Alternative” Approaches
[Thursday, October 25th]

- Kreps, S. E. and Fuhrmann, M. (2011). Attacking the atom: Does bombing nuclear facilities affect proliferation? *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 34(2):161–187
- Braut-Hegghammer, M. (2011). Revisiting osirak: Preventive attacks and nuclear proliferation risks. *International Security*, 36(1):101–132
- Miller, N. L. (2014). The secret success of nonproliferation sanctions. *International Organization*, 68(4)
- SKIM Burr, W. and Richelson, J. T. (2001). Whether to “strangle the baby in the cradle”: the united states and the chinese nuclear program, 1960–64. *International Security*, 25(3):54–99

Optional Readings:

- Kroenig, M. and Volpe, T. (2015). 3-d printing the bomb? the nuclear nonproliferation challenge. *The Washington Quarterly*, 38(3):7–19
- Miller, N. L. (2017). Why nuclear energy programs rarely lead to proliferation. *International Security*, 42(2):40–77
- Fuhrmann, M. and Kreps, S. E. Targeting nuclear programs in war and peace
- Collection of articles. Name: “The Iran Debate: To Strike or Not to Strike” In the Journal Foreign Affairs January 2012.

16. Nuclear Latency
[Tuesday, October 30th]

- Levite, A. E. (2003). Never say never again: nuclear reversal revisited. *International Security*, 27(3):59–88

- Mehta, R. N. and Whitlark, R. E. (2016). Unpacking the iranian nuclear deal: Nuclear latency and us foreign policy. *The Washington Quarterly*, 39(4):45–61
- Cohen, A. and Miller, M. (2010). Bringing israel’s bomb out of the basement-has nuclear ambiguity outlived its shelf life. *Foreign Aff.*, 89:30

⇒ **RESEARCH PAPER: 1 page overview due**

17. Norms and ethics

]Thursday, November 1st]

- Schelling, T. C. (2006). An astonishing 60 years: The legacy of hiroshima. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 103(16):6089–6093
- Jervis, R. (1989). *The meaning of the nuclear revolution: Statecraft and the prospect of Armageddon*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, chapter 4 (Morality and International Strategy). Available here.
- Tannenwald, N. (1999). The nuclear taboo: The united states and the normative basis of nuclear non-use. *International organization*, 53(3):433–468
- Press, D. G., Sagan, S. D., and Valentino, B. A. (2013). Atomic aversion: Experimental evidence on taboos, traditions, and the non-use of nuclear weapons. *American Political Science Review*, 107(1):188–206

Optional Readings:

- Walzer, M. (2015). *Just and unjust wars: A moral argument with historical illustrations*. Basic books, pages 269-283. Available here.
 - Avey, P. C. (2015). Who’s afraid of the bomb? the role of nuclear non-use norms in confrontations between nuclear and non-nuclear opponents. *Security Studies*, 24(4):563–596
 - Tannenwald, N. (2005). Stigmatizing the bomb: Origins of the nuclear taboo. *International Security*, 29(4):5–49
 - Sagan, Scott D. “Realist perspectives on ethical norms and weapons of mass destruction,” in Hashmi, Sohail H., and Steven P. Lee, eds. *Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives*. Cambridge University Press, 2004: 73-95.
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18. Nuclear Terrorism

[Tuesday, November 6th]

- Lieber, K. A. and Press, D. G. (2013). Why states won’t give nuclear weapons to terrorists. *International Security*, 38(1):80–104
- Mueller, J. (2009). *Atomic obsession: nuclear alarmism from Hiroshima to al-Qaeda*. Oxford University Press, chapters 12-14. Available here.

- Allison, G. (2004). How to stop nuclear terror. *Foreign Affairs*, pages 64–74
- Bunn, M. and Wier, A. (2006). Terrorist nuclear weapon construction: how difficult? *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 607(1):133–149

Optional Readings:

- Bunn, M. and Wier, A. (2005). The seven myths of nuclear terrorism. *Current History*, 104(681):153
- Matthew Bunn and Susan Martin, “Is Nuclear Terrorism a Real Threat?” in Gottlieb, Stuart, ed. *Debating terrorism and counterterrorism: conflicting perspectives on causes, contexts, and responses*. CQ Press, 2013, Chapter 6: 172-208.

19. NO CLASS MEETING
Thursday, November 8th

20. Is “Global Zero” possible or desirable?
[Tuesday, November 13th]

- George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 2007.
- Schelling, T. C. (2009). A world without nuclear weapons? *Daedalus*, 138(4):124–129
- Glaser, C. (1998). The flawed case for nuclear disarmament. *Survival*, 40(1):112–128
- Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Zero? Why Not Nuclear Infinity?” *The Wall Street Journal*, July 30, 2011.
- Sagan, S. D. and Waltz, K. N. (2010). Is nuclear zero the best option? *The National Interest*, (109):88–96

Optional Readings:

- Perkovich, G. (2017). *Abolishing nuclear weapons*. Routledge, pp. 7-40.
- Gavin, F. J. (2012). *Nuclear statecraft: history and strategy in America’s atomic age*. Cornell University Press, chapter 8. Available here.
- Remarks by President Barack Obama in Prague, April 5, 2009

21. What is current U.S. Strategy?
[Thursday, November 15th]

- Daalder, I. and Lodal, J. (2008). The logic of zero: Toward a world without nuclear weapons. *Foreign Affairs*, pages 80–95
- Gray, C. S. and Payne, K. (1980). Victory is possible. *Foreign Policy*, (39):14–27

- Lieber, K. A. and Press, D. G. (2009). The nukes we need-preserving the american deterrent. *Foreign Aff.*, 88:39
- Lieber, K. A. and Press, D. G. (2006). The rise of us nuclear primacy. *Foreign Aff.*, 85:42

22. NO CLASS MEETING (Thanksgiving week)
[**Tuesday, November 20th**]

23. SIMULATION
[**Tuesday, November 27th**]

24. SIMULATION
[**Thursday, November 29th**]

25. SIMULATION
[**Tuesday, December 4th**]

26. GUEST LECTURE: Andrew Coe (Vanderbilt University)

“What is the Iran deal, where did it come from, what are the consequences of exiting it?”
[**Thursday, December 6th**]

- Matthew Kroenig. “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike Is the Least Bad Option.” *Foreign Affairs* 91.1 (2012): 76-86.
- Colin H. Kahl. “Not Time to Attack Iran: Why War Should Be a Last Resort.” *Foreign Affairs* 91.2 (2012): 166-173.
- Jeffrey M. Kaplow and Rebecca Davis Gibbons. “The Days After a Deal with Iran: Implications for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.” *RAND Perspective* (2015), PE-135-RC.
- Colin H. Kahl. “The Myth of a ‘Better’ Iran Deal.” *Foreign Policy* September 26, 2017.

Optional Readings:

- Muhammet A. Bas and Andrew J. Coe. “Give Peace a (Second) Chance: A Theory of Nonproliferation Deals.” *International Studies Quarterly* 63.1 (2018): 606-617.
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27. GUEST LECTURE: Jane Vaynman (Temple University)

“What is the INF treaty, why was it signed, and why did the US just withdraw?” [**Tuesday, December 11th**]

- The INF Treaty at a Glance. Available here.
 - “It’s time to Make a New Deal,” Scott A. Cuomo. Available here.
 - “RIP INF: The End of a Landmark Treaty.” Available here.
 - “Ideology Over Interest? Trump’s Costly INF Decision.” Available here.
 - “Russian Strategy and the End of the INF Treaty,” Michael Fitzsimmons, *Survival* 60/6: 119-136.
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⇒ **Thursday, December 13th: RESEARCH PAPER DUE**