

PPS 320 • HST 322 • PS 328
Statecraft & Strategy

Duke University

Sanford School of Public Policy

Fall 2021

Gross Hall, Room 107

Tuesdays and Thursdays, 8:30am–9:45am

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Or by appointment

COURSE DESCRIPTION

How do states reconcile the limited resources they have at their disposal with the virtually boundless range of things they want to do in the world? How can policy-makers use power — be it cultural, diplomatic, economic, military, or otherwise — to achieve their goals and do so effectively and efficiently? How might leaders begin to make sense of a dynamic and seemingly infinitely complex world and identify priorities, opportunities, and threats in the short-term and over the long haul?

The answer to these questions is one of the most elusive concepts in public policy: strategy, the bridging of ends and means.

In this course, students will be introduced to the concept of strategy as it has been practiced in the past — and might be in the future — by examining key concepts and texts in the field as well as historical cases of its successful (and unsuccessful) employment. It will introduce students to the political, economic, and other drivers of international affairs, and will be a semester-long exercise in applying the “lessons of history” to contemporary public-policy challenges.

These insights from the past are relevant not only to students envisioning careers in foreign policy, but also to those whose interests lie in activism, business, politics, and other fields. Thinking broadly about the applicability of these lessons will be integral to this course.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

This class is designed to give undergraduate students an introduction to the theory and practice of strategy from an international and historical perspective with an eye to contemporary challenges. Its primary objectives are eightfold:

1. Connect the study and lessons of the past with contemporary policy-making challenges
2. Develop familiarity with key works of strategic theory and their contexts
3. Understand major episodes in international diplomatic and military history and how strategy figured in changes to the international system
4. Consider the ethics of leadership at war and peace and the tensions which can arise between democracy and power
5. Explore how leaders have remade the international order and how that order has constrained and shaped their behavior
6. Appreciate the role of technological change in shaping the conduct of statecraft and the making of strategy
7. Apply these skills to today's strategic questions
8. Strengthen policy analysis and research, writing, and oral communication skills

CO-CURRICULAR LEARNING

This course will be augmented by a program of co-curricular learning opportunities at Duke University and particularly the Sanford School.

Guests

In some sessions, guests will join the class to discuss topics in which they have expertise. These will include scholars as well as practitioners from government and the military. These sessions will be identified as far in advance as possible and will occur during the usual class time and relate directly to that session's topic.

Speakers

In partnership with the Duke University Program in American Grand Strategy's History and International Security speakers' series, the Sanford School will host scholars to discuss their latest work pertaining to questions of statecraft and strategy. The timing of these sessions will be selected to enable maximum participation by students in this class (and events will be recorded for those who cannot attend).

Attendance will be open to a wider group, but is expected for students in this course with reasonable frequency.

ASSESSMENT

Students taking this course should expect to be graded rigorously. While grades will not adhere strictly to a curve, students should expect the normal distribution of grades to be something approximating the following: A-range grades reserved for exceptional work, B-range grades reserved for students who perform consistently and well throughout the semester, and C-range and below grades reserved for students whose work is lacking in quality, consistency, or both.

Students will be graded not simply on content, but also on the clarity and effectiveness with which they convey that content. All work should be edited and proofread thoroughly before submission.

You should read carefully the instructions contained in this syllabus, laid out in the section on course policies, pertaining to submitting your written work and adhere to them.

If a final course grade is at the cusp (e.g. between A- and B+), I reserve the right to round up or not — everyone in this situation will receive careful consideration. In this case, factors such as progression or active participation in co-curricular learning opportunities over the semester may be taken into account.

Final grades in this course will be determined based on the following four equally weighted components:

- 25% In-class participation
- 25% Strategy in fiction essay
- 25% Response essay
- 25% Current strategic challenge essay

Each component will be graded on a 100-point scale and weighted as indicated above.

PARTICIPATION

25% of your final grade. Based holistically on participation throughout the semester.

Students should come to class sessions ready to engage, ask questions, and debate. For each session, you should complete the assigned reading (which will be part, but not all, of the material covered in the day's lecture) and come prepared to share your impressions and reactions. Some discussion topics will relate to these materials specifically, and some will push you to apply concepts to more contemporary situations.

If you do not attend and contribute your participation grade will suffer. If you cannot attend a session, you should notify me beforehand if at all possible. Rest assured that I will be understanding of unplanned absences due to unforeseen circumstances.

The nature of your contribution will also count: students who do not engage respectfully and fairly-mindedly and fail to uphold the standards of free inquiry will find that this has deleterious consequences for their participation grades.

STRATEGY IN FICTION ESSAY

25% of your final grade. Due at 11:59pm on 27 September. To be submitted through Sakai's Assignments tool.

We are all strategists, even if we do not think of ourselves as such. One way to hone these skills is to read widely in the theory behind strategies and the real-world applications thereof, as we do in this course. Another is to immerse ourselves in other worlds and think about how we would confront their challenges — that, we can do through reading fiction.

Fiction, particularly novels, offer insight into the human condition and bring us face-to-face with big ideas pertaining to some of the most important aspects of our lives, but as they pertain to others'.

With reference to one work of fiction, students will write a paper not to exceed 2,000 words describing the use — or misuse — of strategy in one novel. This need not focus on the entire sweep of the story, though that is one possible way to approach this assignment, but can hone in on one episode from the work which best illustrates strategic thinking, successful or unsuccessful.

In your allotted 2,000 words, you should introduce the work with enough information for someone who has not read it to be able to understand your subject and explain precisely how one (or more) of the characters implemented strategy, paying attention to both desired ends and available means, as well as how the two were bridged. You are free to draw on concepts we have discussed in class, but that is not required.

The best papers will use an episode from fiction to illustrate how strategic thinking is not just the province of national-security leaders, but rather, is a fact of life for all of us. Furthermore, they will reflect the broad-mindedness which is a key theme of this course.

The following works would be good candidates as the source for this assignment — many, you will note, have little to nothing to do with foreign policy:

1. Chinua Achebe, *A Man of the People*
2. Aravind Adiga, *Last Man in Tower*
3. Jane Austen, *Emma*
4. Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice*
5. Robert Bolt, *A Man for All Seasons*
6. Charlotte Brontë, *Jane Eyre*
7. Miguel de Cervantes, *Don Quixote*
8. Joseph Conrad, *The Secret Agent*
9. Dante, *Inferno*
10. Robertson Davies, *The Rebel Angels*
11. Tadeusz Dołęga-Mostowicz, *The Career of Nicodemus Dyzma*
12. Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Demons*
13. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust*
14. Joe Haldeman, *The Forever War*
15. Jaroslav Hašek, *The Good Soldier Svejk*
16. Joseph Heller, *Catch-22*
17. Ernest Hemingway, *For Whom the Bell Tolls*
18. John Hersey, *A Bell for Adano*
19. Homer, *The Odyssey*
20. James Jones, *The Thin Red Line*
21. Rudyard Kipling, *Kim*
22. Norman Mailer, *The Naked and the Dead*

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| 23. Emily St. John Mandel, <i>Station Eleven</i> | 31. Marcel Proust, <i>Remembrance of Things Past</i> |
| 24. Hilary Mantel, <i>Wolf Hall</i> | 32. Mario Puzo, <i>The Godfather</i> |
| 25. Ian McEwan, <i>Atonement</i> | 33. Erich Maria Remarque, <i>All Quiet on the Western Front</i> |
| 26. Herman Melville, <i>Moby-Dick</i> | 34. Mary Shelly, <i>Frankenstein</i> |
| 27. John Milton, <i>Paradise Lost</i> | 35. Muriel Spark, <i>The Mandelbaum Gate</i> |
| 28. Linda Nagata, <i>The Last Good Man</i> | 36. Virgil, <i>Aenid</i> |
| 29. George Orwell, <i>1984</i> | 37. James Webb, <i>Fields of Fire</i> |
| 30. Boris Pasternak, <i>Doctor Zhivago</i> | 38. Yevgeny Zamyatin, <i>We</i> |

Students wishing to use another work as their source for this assignment may do so with my permission; in making that request, you should very briefly identify the episode contained therein which makes it a good fit for the assignment, and affirm that you have not used the book for another assignment of this nature (broadly defined) at Duke.

Having already a book does not disqualify it, but students are encouraged to use this as an opportunity to expand their horizons and read broadly.

RESPONSE ESSAY

25% of your grade. Due one week plus a day after the session you selected (e.g. a paper on Athens and Sparta, the subject of the 14 September session, would be due by 11:59pm on 22 September). To be submitted through Sakai's Assignments tool.

For one of the twenty-one classes from 14 September to 30 November, you will prepare a 2,000-word analytical response paper focusing on one of the prompts listed for each session. You are free to choose whichever prompt listed in the syllabus you find most engaging, and likewise which one topic you will write on.

The purpose of this paper is chiefly analytical. You should convey main points the authors make but rather than just summarize the readings, your job is to marshal the evidence they provide — along with some supplemental research you do — in order to make an argument which engages the question posed. The paper does not have to touch on every single reading, rather, you should focus on those which bear directly on the question you are addressing; in the case of some prompts, for example, you will likely engage with only one reading in depth.

The prompts available to you are written in such a way as to elicit strong, unqualified answers; this is intentional. 2,000 words is not enough to completely exhaustively answer the big questions identified in the syllabus from which you will choose your topic. You will need to focus your paper on one aspect or otherwise scope it to meet the requirements of the assignment — including the word limit. This is intentional: part of your challenge, and part of your assessment, will be the success with which you make the question manageable, zeroing in on one specific aspect, perhaps, but providing a bigger takeaway.

While this is not primarily a research paper, supplemental research is expected for this assignment. You should think about what new evidence you can bring to bear on the question at hand: primary sources, such as memoirs, or other scholars' analyses.

The best papers will neatly and incisively tackle the prompt question you choose, advancing an argument and deploying evidence from the course readings and beyond to support it. Your task is analysis, not summary. Strong argumentation will be rewarded.

CURRENT STRATEGIC CHALLENGE ESSAY

25% of your final grade. Due at 11:59pm on 22 November. To be submitted through Sakai's Assignments tool.

The final, culminating assignment for this course will be to assess a major strategic challenge facing a country today and making a policy recommendation in a paper not exceeding 2,000 words which draws on what you have learned about strategy, in theory and in practice, in this course. You should select your strategic challenge with the scope of the assignment in mind and not try to take on an issue to which you cannot do justice in the allotted word count. You want a topic which is manageable and to which you can make a meaningful, realistic contribution.

You will advise the leadership of your chosen country (which could, but need not, be the United States) on a path forward regarding one strategic challenge facing them today, also of your choice. This is an exercise in conducting policy research, applying the lessons of history, and also advocacy in writing. Though the assignment is very much similar to a policy memorandum, you are not required to use a prescribed format for such documents you may have learned in another class, though you are certainly free to do so if you wish.

First, you should identify and define the problem. Lay out the history of the strategic challenge which you are arguing can now be addressed successfully. If past efforts have failed (or not fully succeeded), address those — with an eye to, later on, explaining why this time will be different. While you need to be fair and honest in presenting the historical context, you will also want to do so with your proposed course of action in mind, and make sure that policy-makers have the context they need to evaluate it for themselves.

Second, you should lay out the range of options available. One will naturally be that for which you are advocating; but in laying out the others, be sure to do so in good faith. Do not set up straw men — challenge yourself with the hardest test, and the end result will be stronger. Your job is not to identify every possible course of action, but to give a fair overview of the range of options available (including, perhaps, doing nothing).

Third, you should identify the most promising option and justify your selection. Here you might bring the lessons of history as you see them (as opposed to just the facts as you interpret them) to bear in bolstering your case. Remember that this is an exercise in persuasion, but also for a policy-maker audience. Bear in mind what we have discussed about how — and how not — to use history when you write, and think critically both about the plausibility of analogies and also how to present a historically grounded argument for a non-historian audience.

These three elements need not be addressed in that order — though you could do worse for an organizing principle — and indeed there are areas of overlap between all of them which make treating them completely separately difficult, or perhaps impossible. Similarly, they do not all require the same weighting as a portion of the overall paper. You should use your best judgement when it comes to structuring the memorandum, but be sure to address these elements in some way. There may be other equally important points in your estimation, which you should include as you see fit.

The best assignments will provide an enriching historical context, lay out a feasible (but not necessarily exhaustive) range of options for overcoming the strategic challenge in question, and persuasively make the case for one of the authors' preference. Furthermore, they will use history in an informed and not heavy-handed way to make an argument and avoid falling into the argument-from-authority fallacy (e.g. "As Napoléon I said...") in so doing. Finally, they will demonstrate serious research into the issue in rigorous, major sources.

COURSE POLICIES

Assignments

In order to pass this course, you must turn in all assignments which comprise part of your grade, as outlined above. Students with outstanding assignments after 3 December, the last day of classes, who have not been granted an extension by me, will fail the class.

The one exception to this would be a response essay on the End of the Cold War, should you select that topic, which is due by 11:59pm on 7 December.

Classroom Conduct

Throughout the semester, you will disagree with your classmates — and me — as we discuss big questions together. These debates are essential to this class and to learning. Advancing arguments and defending them against challenges from people who think differently are essential life skills. This course places a high priority on developing those skills.

These tasks will only be productive if we are respectful of one another. Ad hominem attacks are never acceptable, and I will expect everyone to be fair-minded in considering opposing perspectives and arguments.

Extra Credit

There will be no opportunities for earning extra credit (i.e. beyond the assignments outlined above) in this class.

Final Exam

There will be no final exam in this class, as indicated in the grade breakdown in this syllabus. Duke Hub automatically assigns a time and location for all classes to have a final exam whether one will be offered or not; in this case, it will not.

Formatting

All assignments should be double-spaced, use a conventional 12-point font (e.g. Times New Roman — not Papyrus), and include page numbers and 1” margins. Citations (footnotes and bibliography) should be in Chicago style. Please consult the Chicago Manual of Style’s online citation guide (see: http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html) should any questions about format, etc., arise.

Grade Disputes

If you disagree with your grade for a given assignment, I will re-grade it from scratch. Your grade could go up, go down, or stay the same as a result of this process.

Requests for a re-grade should be made with reasonable promptness after the assignment is returned to you, and not en masse at the end of the semester. They will not be entertained until 48 hours have passed since the grade is posted.

Intellectual Property

Syllabi and lectures are the intellectual property of their authors (i.e. me) and are not to be recorded or disseminated without my explicit authorization. There are valid reasons why you might want to share course materials, but it is always best to ask first.

As so much of class sessions will be discussion-based, concerns about wide and unregulated dissemination of remarks could have a chilling effect on others’ participation; recording any synchronous session is prohibited without the professor’s explicit consent.

Similarly, student work is the intellectual property of the student or students who authored it and will not be shared.

Late Penalties

Any assignment submitted any later than the specified deadline (both date and time) will incur a 10% penalty, and another 10% for every further 24-hour period it is late.

Requests for extensions or accommodations should be made to me as early as possible. While unforeseen circumstances do arise, especially in the midst of a pandemic, it is much easier to accommodate such requests before the due date as opposed to after.

Length

Clear and concise prose is essential to effective presentation and analysis. Work exceeding the specified maximum lengths will be penalized, as could those significantly below.

Footnotes and your bibliography do not count against this word limit, nor do other apparatus such as titles, page numbers, your name, etc.

Plagiarism

Plagiarism, cheating, or any other academic misconduct will automatically result in failing the course and being referred to the appropriate academic dean for disciplinary proceedings.

Students should be familiar with the Duke Community Standard and uphold it: I will not lie, cheat, or steal in my academic endeavors; I will conduct myself honorably in all my endeavors; and I will act if the Standard is compromised.

I expect every student to be familiar with academic standards concerning plagiarism. For more information, see: <https://library.duke.edu/research/plagiarism>. Penalties for such violations can be severe and follow you long after you leave Duke — it is never worth the risk.

Public Health

This course will take place against the backdrop of a global pandemic. These are not normal times. While the pandemic is affecting us all, it does not affect us all equally and in the same ways.

I am committed to being flexible and accommodating students' unique circumstances during these difficult times at Duke. I ask in return that students be understanding of the unprecedented situation in which faculty and staff find themselves and extend the same courtesy to all their fellow Duke community members.

Students are reminded of their obligations to the Duke and Durham communities laid out in the Duke Compact they signed, see: <https://returnto.duke.edu/the-duke-compact/>. It is your responsibility to keep up-to-date with Duke's guidance on mask-wearing, social distancing, etc. and to comply with these regulations in the classroom, see: <https://returnto.duke.edu> and <https://coronavirus.duke.edu>. Failure to do so will be reflected in your participation grade and will have other disciplinary consequences.

Submission

All assignments are to be submitted electronically via the course's Sakai site using the Assignments tool as Word documents and not as PDFs, Apple Pages files, etc. All grading will be done electronically.

Please name your files clearly, indicating their author and their subject matter (e.g. "Simon Miles PPS320 Fiction in Strategy Paper" would be a good file name, "statecraft and strategy assignment" would not).

LECTURE SCHEDULE

All of the course's required readings are available on the course's Sakai site. There is no textbook for this course and no required purchases.

The readings are listed in the syllabus and on Sakai in the order in which they should be read as you prepare for lectures. You should also make use of the Lecture Outline and Key Terms documents in Sakai for every session to prepare for and during lectures.

Each session's entry is made up of three sections:

Prompts	Everyone should bear these in mind as you do the reading, as they are the questions around which each lecture will be structured. Those who choose the session for a response essay will select one as their topic.
Readings	The core materials which will help you understand the lectures, participate in class discussions, and as primary sources, give you an important window into the past.
Supplementary	Optional further reading to supplement the primary-source readings and lecture content. A good place to start for response-essay writers looking for more depth for their work and a starting-point for further research.

INTRODUCTION

24 Aug. Course Overview

Prompts

What is the most important strategic challenge facing the United States today?

Are you a hedgehog or a fox? What are the relative strengths of each?

How do we factor in the human element in any endeavor? Is it an opportunity or a potential pitfall?

Readings

Virginia Woolf, "How Should One Read a Book?," in *Essays on the Self* (Notting Hill, 2014), pp. 64–80.

Isaiah Berlin, "The Hedgehog and the Fox," in *The Proper Study of Mankind* (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1997), pp. 436–498.

William Shakespeare, *Henry V*, act 4, scenes 1 and 3.

Richard Nixon, memorandum to H. R. Haldeman, 13 May 1970.

Drew Gilpin Faust, “To Be ‘A Speaker of Words and a Doer of Deeds’: Literature and Leadership,” remarks at the United States Military Academy, 24 Mar. 2016.

26 Aug. Tactics, Operations, Strategy, and Grand Strategy

Prompts

What definition of grand strategy do you find most compelling? This could come from an assigned reading, or be of your own invention.

How do we connect theory and practice? How do we implement strategy?

What links the various levels of military activity (or any other kind of activity) together?

What are the pitfalls of the historical study of statecraft and strategy?

Readings

Nathan K. Finney and Francis J.H. Park, “A Brief Introduction to Strategy,” in *On Strategy: A Primer*, ed. Nathan K. Finney (Combat Studies Institute Press, 2020), pp. 3–13.

Nina Silove, “Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of ‘Grand Strategy,’” *Security Studies*, vol. 27, no. 1 (2017), pp. 27–57.

Rebecca Friedman Lissner, “What Is Grand Strategy? Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” *Texas National Security Review*, vol. 2, no. 1 (2018), pp. 53–73.

Robert S. Kaplan and Anette Mikes, “Managing Risks: A New Framework,” *Harvard Business Review*, vol. 90, no. 6 (2012), pp. 48–60.

Richard K. Betts, “The Grandiosity of Grand Strategy,” *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 42, no. 4 (2019), pp. 7–22.

Supplementary

John Lewis Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy* (Penguin, 2018).

Colin S. Gray, *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

Charles Hill, *Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order* (Yale University Press, 2010).

Cathal J. Nolan, *The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost* (Oxford University Press, 2017).

Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

31 Aug. Applied History

Prompts

How can we apply the lessons of history to the present responsibly?

How do, or might, policy-makers use history in their work?

What does a historical mindset mean to you? What are its promises and pitfalls?

How do communities use (or abuse) history to suit their purposes? What examples can you think of?

Readings

Eliot A. Cohen, "The Historical Mind and Military Strategy," *Orbis*, vol. 49, no. 4 (2005), pp. 575–588.

Giovanni Gavetti and Jan W. Rivkin, "How Strategists Really Think: Tapping the Power of Analogy," *Harvard Business Review*, vol. 84, no. 4 (2005), pp. 54–63.

Francis J. Gavin, "Thinking Historically: A Guide for Strategy and Statecraft," *War on the Rocks*, 17 Nov. 2016.

William Inboden, "Statecraft, Decision-Making, and the Varieties of Historical Experience: A Taxonomy," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 37, no. 2 (2014), pp. 291–318.

Margaret MacMillan, *Dangerous Games: The Uses and Abuses of History* (Modern Library, 2009), pp. ix–xi, 53–78, 111–170.

Supplementary

Ernest R. May, "*Lessons*" of the Past: *The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 1973).

Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers* (Free Press, 1986).

2 Sept. Sun Tzu on Strategy

Prompts

To what extent is Sun Tzu a product of his time and place?

According to Sun Tzu, how do you win a war?

What are the key insights of Sun Tzu's work? Why do they in particular resonate with you?

How relevant are Sun Tzu's theories today? How might you employ them?

Readings

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 63–149.

Supplementary

Christopher Andrew, *The Secret World: A History of Intelligence* (Yale University Press, 2018), ch. 4.

Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*, 3rd ed. (Routledge, 2001).

Basil Liddel Hart, *Strategy*, 2nd ed. (Meridian, 1991).

Andrew Scobell, "The Chinese Way of War," in *The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present*, ed. John Andreas Olsen and Martin Van Creveld (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 195–206.

Derek M.C. Yuen, *Deciphering Sun Tzu: How to Read The Art of War* (Oxford University Press, 2014).

7 Sept. Kautilya on Strategy

Prompts

To what extent is Kautilya a product of his time and place?

According to Kautilya, how do you win a war?

What are the key insights of Kautilya's work? Why do they in particular resonate with you?

How relevant are Kautilya's theories today? How might you employ them?

Readings

Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, ed. and trans. L. N. Rangarajan (Penguin, 1987), pp. 79, 100–113, 121–125, 133–142, 468–501, 516–542, 566–604, 622–634, 640–646, 699–700.

Supplementary

Christopher Andrew, *The Secret World: A History of Intelligence* (Yale University Press, 2018), ch. 4.

Medha Bisht, *Kautilya's Arthashastra: Philosophy of Strategy* (Routledge, 2020).

Roger Boesche, *The First Great Political Realist: Kautilya and his Arthashastra* (Lexington Books, 2002).

Upinder Singh, *Political Violence in Ancient India* (Harvard University Press, 2017).

9 Sept. Carl von Clausewitz on Strategy

Prompts

To what extent is Clausewitz a product of his time and place?

According to Clausewitz, how do you win a war?

What are the key insights of Clausewitz's work? Why do they in particular resonate with you?

How relevant are Clausewitz's theories today? How might you employ them?

Readings

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 69–182, 566–610.

Supplementary

Christopher Bassford, *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815–1945* (Oxford University Press, 1994).

Antulio J. Eschevaria, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (Oxford University Press, 2007).

Beatrice Heuser, *Reading Clausewitz* (Pimlico, 2002).

Donald Stoker, *Clausewitz: His Life and Work* (Oxford University Press, 2014).

THE CLASSICAL WORLD

14 Sept. Athens and Sparta

Prompts

Why did Athens and Sparta go to war?

Was the expedition to Sicily a mistake?

What does Thucydides tell us about morality and warfare?

Is Thucydides' account of the rise and fall of Athens useful to understanding the problems a democracy experiences in war?

Readings

Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, ed. and trans. C.F. Smith (Harvard University Press, 1919–1923), pp. 1:107–149 (book 1, § 66–88), 1:281–379 (book 2, § 13–65), 2:55–89 (book 3, § 36–50), 2:125–153 (book 3, § 69–85), 2:210–285 (book 4, § 1–41), 3:155–239 (book 5, § 84–116; book 6, § 1–32), 3:259–275 (book 6, § 42–52), 3:287–309 (book 6, § 60–72), 4:57–119 (book 7, § 31–59), 4:147–181 (book 7, § 72–87).

Supplementary

Graham T. Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

Donald Kagan, *The Peloponnesian War* (Viking, 2003).

Robert B. Strassler, ed., *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* (Free Press, 2008).

16 Sept. Carthage

Prompts

What was Hannibal's grand strategy?

Whom should we seek to emulate, Fabius on the march or Hannibal at Cannae?

Why did Hannibal, massively outnumbered, win at Cannae?

Why did Rome's allies not revolt when they had the opportunity?

Readings

Polybius, *The Histories*, ed. F. W. Walbank and Christian Habicht, trans. W. R. Paton (Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 2:189–205 (book 3, § 70–75), 2:215–323 (book 3, § 80–118).

Livy, *History of Rome*, ed. and trans. J. C. Yardley (Harvard University Press, 2019), pp. 5:231–251 (book 22, § 12–18), 5:327–347 (book 22, § 43–50).

Supplementary

Gregory Daly, *Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War* (Routledge, 2002).

Adrian Goldsworthy, *The Punic Wars* (Cassell, 2000).

Patrick N. Hunt, *Hannibal* (Simon and Schuster, 2017).

Richard Miles, *Carthage Must Be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Mediterranean Civilization* (Allen Lane, 2010).

Robert L. O'Connell, *The Ghosts of Cannae: Hannibal and the Darkest Hour of the Roman Republic* (Random House, 2010).

21 Sept. The Roman Empire

Prompts

What made it possible for Rome to build an empire?

What was the defining or the most successful grand strategy of the Roman Empire?

How did the organization of the Roman military change to support its strategy?

Is Gibbon's explanation for the fall of Rome sufficient?

Are the maxims of Vegetius still relevant today?

Readings

Flavius Josephus, *The Jewish War*, ed. and trans. H. St. J. Thackeray (Harvard University Press, 1928), pp. 3:379–421 (book 7, ch. 8–9).

Vegetius, *Epitoma Rei Militaris*, ed. and trans. N. P. Milner (Liverpool University Press, 2001), pp. 62–77 (book 3, ch. 1–6), 83–93 (book 3, ch. 9–13), 100–110 (book 3, ch. 18–22), 114–119 (book 3, ch. 25–26).

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Greg Woolf, *Rome: An Empire's Story* (Oxford University Press, 2012).

THE MODERN WORLD

23 Sept. **The Mongols**

Prompts

How did the use of domesticated horses change warfare most?

How did Mongol grand strategy fit their unique goals?

What accounts for the Mongols' successes against ostensibly superior enemy forces?

Was settling inevitably the Mongols' undoing?

Readings

Paul Kahn, ed., *The Secret History of the Mongols* (North Point Press, 1984), pp. 125–181.

John of Piano Carpini, "History of the Mongols," in *The Mission to Asia: Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, ed. Christopher Dawson (Sheed and Ward, 1955), pp. 3–72.

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Paul Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy*, trans. Thomas Nivison Haining (Blackwell, 1992).

Timothy Way, *The Mongol Art of War* (Westholme, 2017).

28 Sept. **Elizabeth I**

Prompts

How effectively did Elizabeth I use intelligence?

What factor led to the failure of Philip II's grand strategy?

What do Elizabeth I's speeches tell us about her approach to leadership?

Was the launching of the Armada bound to end in disaster?

Readings

"Instructions for Certain Gentlemen Sent Abroad," Jun. 1578.

Bernardino de Mendoza, letter to Alexander Farnese (Prince of Parma), 27 Feb. 1585.

Francis Drake, letter to Elizabeth I, 8 Aug. 1588.

Elizabeth I, remarks at Tilbury, 9 Aug. 1588.

Francisco de Cuellar, "Letter From One Who Sailed with the Spanish Armada and Tells the Story of the Enterprise of England," in *God's Obvious Design*, ed. and trans. P. Gallagher and D.W. Cruikshank (Tamesis, 1990), pp. 223–247.

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Elizabeth I, remarks before Parliament, 30 Nov. 1601.

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Garrett Mattingly, *The Armada* (Mariner, 2005).

Geoffrey Parker, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (Yale University Press, 1998).

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Anne Somerset, *Elizabeth I* (Knopf, 1991).

30 Sept. **The American Revolution**

Prompts

Was the American success in the Revolutionary War a military or a diplomatic victory?

Was Britain's decision to pacify American resistance militarily counterproductive to its grand strategy?

Could the United States have won its independence without the assistance of France?

Did George Washington win the Revolutionary War or did the British simply lose it?

Readings

Declaration of Independence, 4 Jul. 1776.

John Adams, "Plan of the Treaties with France of 1778," 17 Sept. 1776.

Alexander Hamilton, letter to Robert T. Livingston, 28 Jun. 1777.

Benjamin Rush, letter to John Adams, 1 Oct. 1777.

Alexander Hamilton, "The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States," *The Federalist Papers*, no. 8, 20 Nov. 1787.

George Washington, farewell address, 17 Sept. 1796.

Supplementary

Jonathan Dull, *A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution* (Yale University Press, 1985).

John Ferling, *Whirlwind: The American Revolution and the War That Won It* (Bloomsbury Press, 2015).

George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign Relations Since 1776* (Oxford University Press, 2008), ch. 1–2.

Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (Penguin, 1998), ch. 4.

Andrew Jackson O'Shaughnessy, *The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire* (Yale University Press, 2013).

Russel F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Indiana University Press, 1977), ch. 1.

5 Oct. Fall Break

The class will not meet.

7 Oct. Napoléon I

Prompts

What is a decisive victory, and did Napoléon I ever win one?

What do Napoléon I's writings about himself suggest about reasons for his successes or failures?

What are the benefits and pitfalls of unified political and military leadership?

Why did Napoléon I fail to achieve lasting strategic success?

Readings

Antoine-Henri Jomini, *The Art of War*, ed. J. D. Hittle (Telegraph Press, 1952), pp. 39–99, 157–161.

The Levée en Masse, 23 Aug. 1793.

Napoléon I, letter to the Directory, 14 May 1796.

Leo Tolstoy, *War and Peace*, trans. Constance Garnett (John Lane, 1911), pp. 951–1034 (book 10, ch. 19–39).

Napoléon I, remarks to the Legislative Body, 14 Feb. 1813.

Napoléon I, remarks, 20 Apr. 1814.

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Dominic Lieven, *Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814* (Allen Lane, 2009).

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Peter Paret, *The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806* (Princeton University Press, 2009).

Jonathan Riley, *Napoleon as a General: Command from the Battlefield to Grand Strategy* (Continuum, 2007).

Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics* (Clarendon, 1994), ch. 2–11.

12 Oct. The Concert of Europe

Prompts

How compatible were the victorious powers' goals for the post-Napoleonic Wars peace?

Why did the Concert of Europe break down?

What was Metternich's grand strategy?

Why did Britain underwrite the Monroe Doctrine?

Readings

Robert Stewart (Lord Castlereagh), letter to Robert Jenkinson (Earl of Liverpool), 22 Jan. 1814.

Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, letter to Louis XVIII, 1 Feb. 1815.

Robert Stewart (Lord Castlereagh), memorandum, 12 Aug. 1815.

Klemens von Metternich, letter to Francis I, 2 Dec. 1820.

James Monroe, message to Congress, 2 Dec. 1823.

Supplementary

John Bew, *Castlereagh: A Life* (Oxford University Press, 2012).

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Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (Penguin, 1998), ch. 6.

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Wolfram Siemann, *Metternich: Strategist and Visionary*, trans. Daniel Steuer (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019).

THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD

14 Oct. The American Civil War

Prompts

Why did the North find itself bogged down in a protracted war of attrition?

Did Lincoln ask more of his generals than they could reasonably have been expected to deliver?

What, according to Lincoln, was the Civil War about?

Was the outcome of the Civil War a product of strategies or execution?

Readings

Abraham Lincoln, inaugural remarks, 4 Mar. 1861.

William H. Seward, letter to Charles Francis Adams, 21 May 1861.

Abraham Lincoln, letter to George B. McClellan, 13 Oct. 1862.

Abraham Lincoln, proclamation no. 95, "Regarding the Status of Slaves in States Engaged in Rebellion Against the United States," 1 Jan. 1863.

Abraham Lincoln, letter to Erastus Corning et al., 12 Jun 1863.

Abraham Lincoln, remarks at Gettysburg, Penn., 19 Nov. 1863.

Abraham Lincoln, inaugural remarks, 4 Mar. 1865.

Supplementary

Richard Carwardine, *Lincoln: A Life of Purpose and Power* (Vintage, 2007).

Allen C. Guelzo, *Fateful Lightning: A New History of the Civil War and Reconstruction* (Oxford University Press, 2012).

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Donald Stoker, *The Grand Design: Strategy and the US Civil War* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

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19 Oct. German Unification

Prompts

Was Bismarck successful because of his own merits, or a permissive context?

Who better understood the proper relationship between political and military authorities during war, Moltke or Bismarck?

How did technological advancements transform warfare by the time of the wars of German unification?

How would you characterize Moltke's way of war?

Readings

Helmuth von Moltke, “The Nature of War,” in *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings*, ed. Daniel J. Hughes, trans. Daniel J. Hughes and Harry Bell (Presidio, 1993), pp. 21–73.

Helmuth von Moltke, remarks, Apr. 1861.

Helmuth von Moltke, memorandum, 2 Apr. 1866.

Ems dispatches, original and edited, 13 Jul. 1870.

Otto von Bismarck and Wilhelm I, memorandum of conversation, 17 Jan. 1871.

Benjamin Disraeli, remarks before the House of Commons, 9 Feb. 1871.

Supplementary

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21 Oct. The First World War

Prompts

Why did the quick, decisive victories anticipated in 1914 not materialize?

Was the Schlieffen Plan a good strategy badly executed, or irredeemable?

What was the primary reason for which World War I broke out?

Why did the Allied Powers fail to achieve a lasting peace settlement?

Readings

Alfred von Schlieffen, “Memorandum of 1905,” with his 1906 addendum and commentary by Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, in *Alfred von Schlieffen’s Military Writings*, ed. and trans. Robert T. Foley (Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 163–179.

John McCrae, “In Flanders Fields,” *Punch*, vol. 149, no. 3913, 8 Dec. 1915, p. 468.

Henning von Holtzendorff, memorandum to Paul von Hindenburg, 22 Dec. 1916.

Woodrow Wilson, remarks before a Joint Session of Congress, 2 Apr. 1917.

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Hew Strachan, *The First World War* (Oxford University Press, 2001).

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Russel F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Indiana University Press, 1977), ch. 10.

26 Oct. The Bolshevik Revolution

Prompts

Was the accession to power of the Bolsheviks a revolution or a coup?

What role did World War I play in precipitating the Bolshevik revolution?

How did the Bolshevik Revolution change international relations?

Readings

Vladimir I. Lenin, “What is to Be Done?,” 1902, pt. 4.

Alexandra M. Kollontai, “Who Needs the War?,” 1915.

Vladimir I. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," 7 Apr. 1917.

Vladimir I. Lenin, "Letter to American Workers," 20 Aug. 1918.

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Stephen F. Cohen, *Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888–1938* (Oxford University Press, 1980).

Orlando Figes, *A People's Tragedy: A History of the Russian Revolution* (Viking, 1997).

Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2008).

Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution* (Knopf, 1990).

Stephen A. Smith, *Red Petrograd: Revolution in the Factories, 1917–1918* (Cambridge University Press, 1983).

28 Oct. The Treaty of Versailles

Prompts

How did the origins and conduct of World War I shape war-termination and peacemaking at the end?

Why did the Allied Powers fail so badly in achieving a lasting peace settlement?

Who were the principal losers of the Versailles settlement?

Why was the League of Nations a failure?

Readings

Woodrow Wilson, remarks before a Joint Session of Congress, 8 Jan. 1918.

John J. Pershing, letter to the Allied Supreme War Council, 30 Oct. 1918.

Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919: Being Reminiscences of the Paris Peace Conference* (Houghton Mifflin, 1933), pp. 365–371.

Treaty of Versailles, 28 Jun. 1919, pt. 1, 3, 4 (§ 1), 5, 7, 8.

Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, letter to Georges Clemenceau, 29 May 1919.

Paul von Hindenburg, remarks, 18 Nov. 1919.

Henry Cabot Lodge, remarks in the United States Senate, 12 Aug. 1919.

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Anne Hagendorn, *Savage Peace: Hope and Fear in America, 1919* (Simon and Schuster, 2007).

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Margaret Macmillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World* (Random House, 2003).

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Christopher McKnight Nichols, *Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age* (Harvard University Press, 2015).

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

2 Nov. The Western Front of the European Theater

Prompts

Did air power transform the conduct of war?

Did intelligence, not direct combat, really win World War II in Europe?

How effective were US and British leaders in developing new ways of working in a joint and combined operational environment?

Was strategic bombing important enough to the Allies' success to justify its costs to German civilians?

What Western Front-specific factor best explains Nazi Germany's defeat?

Readings

Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, trans. Dino Ferarri (US Government Printing Office, 1983), pp. 3–33.

Adolf Hitler, remarks at the Reich Chancellery, 5 Nov. 1937.

Winston S. Churchill, remarks in the House of Commons, 5 Oct. 1939.

“Joint Board Estimate of United States Overall Production Requirements,” 11 Sept. 1941.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, annual budget message, 6 Jan. 1943.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, order of the day, 6 Jun. 1944.

Franklin D’Olier et al., “The United States Strategic Bombing Survey,” 1 Jul. 1946, pp. 5–42.

Supplementary

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Joseph A. Maiolo, *Cry Havoc: How the Arms Race Drove the World to War, 1931–1941* (Basic Books, 2012).

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Andrew Roberts, *Masters and Commanders: How Roosevelt, Churchill, Marshall, and Alanbrooke Won the War in the West* (Allen Lane, 2008).

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Russel F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Indiana University Press, 1977), ch. 14.

4 Nov. The Eastern Front of the European Theater

Prompts

Was the concept of ‘total war’ a new phenomenon?

Was World War II in fact decided on the Eastern Front?

How was the Soviet experience of war unique?

What Eastern Front–specific factor best explains Nazi Germany’s defeat?

Readings

Erich Ludendorff, *Total War*, trans. Wilhelm Kuserow (Friends of Europe, 1936), pp. 6–30.

“Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” 23 Aug. 1939.

Martin Bormann, minutes of a meeting with Adolf Hitler, 16 Jul. 1941.

Iosef V. Stalin, order no. 227, 28 Jul. 1942.

Oleksandr E. Korniyuchuk, *The Front*, act 1, scene 2–act 2, scene 1.

Alfred Wetzler and Rudolf Vrba, “Testimony of Two Escapees from Auschwitz-Birkenau Exterminations Camps at Oświęcim, Poland,” Apr. 1944.

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Ian Ona Johnson, *Faustian Bargain: The Soviet-German Partnership and the Origins of the Second World War* (Oxford University Press, 2021).

Catherine Merridale, *Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939–1945* (Metropolitan Books, 2006).

Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953* (Yale University Press, 2008), ch. 1–7.

Brandon M. Schechter, *The Stuff of Soldiers: A History of the Red Army in World War II through Objects* (Cornell University Press, 2019).

Timothy D. Snyder, *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (Basic Books, 2012).

9 Nov. The Pacific Theater

Prompts

Did Japanese leaders embark on the Pacific War with a sound concept of the likely nature of the war?

What is unique about Mao's theory of war?

Would the Chinese Communists have been able to achieve their revolutionary seizure of power without a Japanese military occupation?

Can drastic wartime measures like the internment of Japanese-Americans ever be justified?

Was the Truman administration justified in using the atomic bomb against Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

Readings

Franklin D. Roosevelt, "An Appeal to Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Poland to Refrain from Air Bombing of Civilians," 1 Sept. 1939.

Mao Zedong, "Guerilla Warfare," in *Mao Tse-Tung on Guerilla Warfare*, ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Praeger, 1961), pp. 41–114.

Hsiao Li Lindsay, *Bold Plum: With the Guerrillas in China's War Against Japan* (Lulu, 2007), pp. 129–146, 209–219.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, executive order no. 9066, "Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas," 19 Feb. 1942.

Franklin D'Olier et al., "The United States Strategic Bombing Survey," 1 Jul. 1946, pp. 49–120.

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S. C. M. Paine, *The Wars for Asia, 1911–1949* (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Russel F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Indiana University Press, 1977), ch. 13.

11 Nov. Yalta and Bretton Woods

Prompts

Was the Atlantic Charter a grand strategy and was Yalta a means to that end?

On what issues did US and British economic plans chiefly disagree and why? What do these disagreements tell us about the two countries?

Was Bretton Woods a negotiation between the east and west sides of the Atlantic or the northern and southern hemispheres?

Was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system inevitable?

Readings

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, “The Atlantic Charter,” 14 Aug. 1941.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Iosef V. Stalin, and Winston Churchill, “Report of the Crimea Conference,” 11 Feb. 1945.

Harry Dexter White, “Preliminary Draft Proposal for a United Nations Stabilization Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations,” Apr. 1942.

John Maynard Keynes, “Proposals for an International Clearing Union,” Apr. 1943.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, message to Congress, 12 Feb. 1945.

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Francis J. Gavin, *Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958–1971* (University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

Patrick J. Hearden, *Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order During World War II* (University of Arkansas Press, 2002).

Eric Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order* (Cornell University Press, 2014).

G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, 2nd ed. (Princeton University Press, 2019), ch. 6.

Serhii Plokhyy, *Yalta: The Price of Peace* (Viking, 2010).

Benn Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order* (Princeton University Press, 2013).

THE COLD WAR WORLD

16 Nov. Containment

Prompts

What differentiated Kennan's and Novikov's visions of the post-World War II world?

What was the weakness of the strategy of containment?

Could the Cold War have been avoided, and Stalin kept a US partner, were it not for unforced US errors?

Was the expansion of containment beyond Eurasia inevitable?

Readings

George F. Kennan, memorandum to James F. Byrnes, 22 Feb. 1946.

Nikolai V. Novikov, memorandum to Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, 27 Sept. 1946.

Harry S. Truman, remarks before a Joint Session of Congress, 12 Mar. 1947.

George C. Marshall, remarks at Harvard University, 5 Jun. 1947.

National Security Council memorandum, no. 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” 14 Apr. 1950.

National Security Council memorandum, no. 162/2, “Basic National Security Policy,” 30 Oct. 1953.

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William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945–1960: The Soul of Containment* (Cambridge University Press, 2008).

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Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (University of North Carolina Press, 2007), ch. 1–6.

18 Nov. Vietnam

Prompts

What issue led the United States go to war in Vietnam?

Was US military power the solution to South Vietnam’s problems?

Was the North's victory in Vietnam due more to the weaknesses of the South, US strategic mistakes, or its own strategy?

How did Giáp differ from Mao?

What might a successful US counterinsurgency strategy have looked like?

Readings

John F. Kennedy, inaugural remarks, 20 Jan. 1961.

Võ Nguyên Giáp, "People's War, People's Army" and "The Political and Military Line of Our Party," in *The Military Art of People's War*, ed. Russell Stetler (Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 101–116, 163–184.

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Lyndon B. Johnson, "US Policy in Southeast Asia," 5 Aug. 1964.

J. Edgar Hoover, remarks before the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, Jul. 1970.

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Mark Atwood Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History* (Oxford University Press, 2008).

Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (University of California Press, 2001).

Robert S. McNamara, with Brian VanDeMark, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (Times Books, 1995).

Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, *Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam* (University of North Carolina Press, 2012).

23 Nov. D tente

Prompts

Why did the United States and China negotiate the ‘opening’?

Was d tente a noble failure, well-intentioned but naive and, in terms of results, largely disastrous?

To which superpower’s advantage did the Helsinki Final Act redound?

What impulse motivated d tente?

Readings

Richard M. Nixon, remarks at the Bohemian Club, 29 Jul. 1967.

Henry A. Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” 1969.

Henry A. Kissinger, remarks to members of the press, 16 Feb. 1970.

Mao Zedong, “On Contradiction,” Aug. 1937.

Richard M. Nixon and Mao Zedong, memorandum of conversation, 21 Mar. 1972.

Vaclav Havel et al., “Charta 77,” Dec. 1976.

Supplementary

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25 Nov. Thanksgiving Break

The class will not meet.

30 Nov. Reagan and Gorbachev

Prompts

Did Ronald Reagan have a grand strategy, or was he an improviser?

What was Gorbachev's grand strategy?

Who deserves greater credit for ending the Cold War, Reagan or Gorbachev?

Did the United States win the Cold War, or did the Soviet Union lose it?

Is the end of the Cold War a victory for leaders or publics?

Readings

Department of the Army, field manual no. 100-5, "Operations," May 1986, pp. 1–26.

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Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States–Soviet Relations," 16 Jan. 1984.

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Yegor T. Gaidar, "The Soviet Collapse: Grain and Oil," Apr. 2007, American Enterprise Institute.

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, remarks at the Council of Europe, 6 Jul. 1989.

Supplementary

Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Cornell University Press, 2002).

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Jack F. Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended* (Random House, 2004).

Simon Miles, *Engaging the Evil Empire: Washington, Moscow, and the Beginning of the End of the Cold War* (Cornell University Press, 2020).

Sarah B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network* (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

William Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times* (W.W. Norton, 2017).

James Graham Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War* (Cornell University Press, 2014).

Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (University of North Carolina Press, 2007), ch. 9–10.

THE WORLD TODAY

2 Dec. Conclusions

Prompts

What are the three most important strategic challenge facing the United States today, and why? How and why have your answers changed since you answered this question at the beginning of this course?

What strategies will leaders need in order to succeed in the twenty-first century?

What should the strategists of the future be reading to prepare themselves?

Which case studies offer the most insight into the challenges of the future?

Readings

Anne-Marie Slaughter, “How to Succeed in the Networked World,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 95, no. 6 (2016), pp. 76–89.

Bruce W. Jentleson, “Refocusing US Grand Strategy on Pandemic and Environmental Mass Destruction,” *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 43, no. 3 (2020), pp. 7–29.

Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, “The Home Front: Why an Internationalist Foreign Policy Needs a Stronger Domestic Foundation,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 100, no. 3 (2021): pp. 92–101.