

# Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Seminar

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## PANEL 1: Extended Deterrence

### 1. Seukhoon Paul Choi, RAND

#### *Deterrence and the ROK-US Alliance, 2009-2019: Persistent Cooperation, Uncertain Cohesion*

##### Issue and Importance

This research aims to better understand alliance cohesion in deterrence amid transformative shifts in the external threat allies face. Specifically, the project explores how perceptions of the North Korean threat – as it changed from conventional to nuclear and from local to global – affected cohesion in the Republic of Korea (ROK) – United States (US) Alliance. The project offers insight into the evolving nature of extended deterrence and assurance in the ROK-US relationship, but also into changing requirements for effective deterrence in this second nuclear age and era of Sino-US competition. Consequently, findings will address the increasingly important but understudied nexus of alliances and US nuclear policy, and will also support US efforts to operationalize an “integrated deterrence” posture.<sup>1</sup>

Advances in the nuclear and missile capabilities of North Korea (DPRK) have fundamentally altered the perceived threat it poses to the United States and South Korea. China’s rise and an increasingly complex strategic environment also complicate the formulation of alliance responses to continuing North Korean provocations. These developments, together with evolving ROK and US defense postures, are shifting deterrence dynamics and have caused fissures in the alliance that are challenging alliance effectiveness in deterring aggression and potential nuclear use.

Relatedly, although every US Joint Chiefs chairman has emphasized America’s alliances and partnerships as the country’s greatest advantage, there is an increasing need for their repair and recalibration.<sup>2</sup> In particular, the case is often made that the United States and its allies must

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<sup>1</sup> Jim Garamone, “Austin Discusses Need for Indo-Pacific Partnerships in the Future,” *DOD News*, July 27, 2021, <https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2708315/austin-discusses-need-for-indo-pacific-partnerships-in-the-future/>.

<sup>2</sup> Winston Churchill’s position that “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them,” though a subject of ongoing debate, is a widely held position. For US perspectives advocating the value of alliances, see Abraham Denmark, *U.S. Strategy in the Asian Century: Empowering Allies and Partners*, Woodrow Wilson Center Series (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020); Mira Rapp-Hooper, *Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2020); Jim Talent, “Why Alliances Matter,” *National Review Online*, July 27, 2016; James N. Mattis and Francis J. West, *Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead*, First edition (New York: Random House, 2019). Also, for commentary

change how they work together in “waging deterrence.”<sup>3</sup> Yet little is known about the drivers of alliance cohesion in the current threat environment in which adversaries exploit intra-alliance variance in perceptions of stakes and risk. The security concepts, dynamics, and metrics upon which present alliance theories are based, as well as the way in which such military partnerships are managed, require an update, given today’s transformed geostrategic, technological, and political context.

The primary question of this project asks: how did changing ROK and US perceptions of the DPRK threat from 2009 to 2019 affect ROK-US cohesion regarding deterrence strategies? In support of this inquiry, the study asks four specific questions: 1) How did the ROK and US perceive the evolving deterrence challenge North Korea posed after 2009? 2) To what degree or in what ways did ROK and US responses to this changing threat converge or diverge? 3) How did the perceived risks of escalation for each ally influence these responses? 4) What factors facilitated or hindered the two allies from agreeing on strategies and coordinating supporting efforts?

### Research Approach and Rationale

This study will analyze alliance cohesion relative to several foundational concepts in deterrence. The project focuses on the ROK-US Alliance and the period from 2009 to 2019 for several reasons. The relationship between South Korea and the United States, in addition to facing an increasingly capable adversary, enjoys a high level of institutionalization and integration – attributes that are credited with facilitating cohesion. This makes examples of uncertain cohesion and potential discord all the more fascinating and worthy of analysis at this critical juncture.

The decade under study is ideal for the project’s focus, as it is during this time that South Korea began viewing DPRK aggression and challenges to deterrence – even when conventional and limited in nature – within the shadow of North Korea’s nuclear capability. This was a fundamentally different context from previous provocations. Further, it was during this period that North Korea passed a definitive threshold and increasingly posed a different threat to the United States. This was made clear by former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates describing in 2009 North Korea’s military capabilities as having reached a point where they represented “a direct threat to the United States,” and by the outgoing Obama administration later identifying it as the top national security priority for the Trump administration.<sup>4</sup>

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on the need for alliance reform, see Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Saving America’s Alliances,” *Foreign Affairs*, February 10, 2020; Elbridge Colby, “Don’t Scrap America’s Alliances. Fix Them,” *National Interest*, June 29, 2016.

<sup>3</sup> Kevin Chilton and Greg Weaver, “Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 3, no. 1 (2009): 31–42; Brad Roberts, “Living with a Nuclear-Arming North Korea,” *38 North Special Report*, November 2020; S. Paul Choi, “Deterring North Korea: The Need for Collective Resolve and Alliance Transformation,” *38 North*, July 23, 2020.

<sup>4</sup> Robert Michael Gates, *Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014); Gerald Seib, Jay Solomon, and Carol E. Lee, “Barack Obama Warns Donald Trump on North Korea Threat,” *Wall Street Journal*, n.d.

During the 2009 to 2019 period, the two allies faced challenges to both immediate and general deterrence. In order to understand the former, the study will examine in detail three crisis episodes:

- 2010 Sinking of the ROK Ship *Cheonan* and Shelling of Yeongpyong Island
- 2015 Laying of Mines to Maim ROK Soldiers and Firing Artillery at ROK Guard Posts
- 2017 Testing of Nuclear and Missile Capabilities

These junctures of heightened tensions raised risks of escalation that should highlight the extent to which the two allies were aligned or at odds with one another regarding how to respond and how to reinforce deterrence. Further, as the crises in 2010 and 2015 involved DPRK attacks on South Korea, while that in 2017 consisted of nuclear and ICBM tests that messaged challenges to the US homeland, the case selection allows comparison of potentially differing effects of challenges to primary and extended deterrence. Additionally, this study will address the differing natures and dynamics of conventional and nuclear challenges, to include the stability-instability paradox. Finally, in discussing changes to and the alignment of strategies and activities, a comparison will be made of how the two allies assessed approaches such as escalation dominance, counterforce, and countervalue; as well as proportionality in the use of force or in responses across domains.

The periods of lowered tensions or “steady state” following these crises (2011-14, 2016, 2018-19) should also provide an opportunity to examine subsequent actions that confirm cohesion or discord, as well as reflect efforts to manage this intra-alliance dynamic. The period will also allow this study to examine whether shifts in administrations from progressive to conservative in both South Korea and the United States may have influenced the effects of the transformed DPRK threat on alliance cohesion.

The project will examine primary and secondary source material in both English and Korean. To characterize changes in the parties’ military capabilities, the study will include a balanced review of institutional assessments, such as the *IJSS Military Balance*, and of public records – such as defense white papers and the *Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea* – released by the ROK and US governments. Analysis of shifts in declaratory policy and strategy will be based on a close examination of media, public affairs statements, and communiqués from alliance consultative mechanisms – such as the Korea Integrated Defense Dialogue and ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting; major policy documents – including the US National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, Missile Defense Review; as well as annual congressional/national assembly hearings and testimonies. These publicly released statements are useful because they are also used by both militaries as strategic messaging opportunities for both deterrence and assurance purposes. Because of this, however, these communications are deliberately designed to reflect unity and conceal underlying disagreement within the alliance.

To address this shortcoming, the study will review and analyze journalistic accounts from opposition media in South Korea, reports in Korean by principal and working-level ROK policy staff that are less accessible to US scholars, and the biographies or memoirs already published by former US defense secretaries, as well as semi-structured interviews with former military, policy leaders, and subject matter experts (SMEs) – including those at RAND, who have conducted in-depth work on Korea and nuclear-shadowed crises. Having served in support of the deterrence strategy and policy dialogue between the US Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND), and in the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC) with the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (RJCS), I expect access to policy principals and senior military leaders who worked on deterrence and alliance management during the 2009-19 period. The insights of these individuals will provide unique perspectives into perceptions of escalation, reasons for preferred strategies, and the debates that occurred regarding how best to respond to DPRK and to alliance management challenges. Anticipated subjects for interviews include, but are not limited to the following:

<u>US</u>	<u>ROK</u>
Dr. Brad Roberts (OSD, 2009-13)	GEN Jung Seung-Jo (CFC, 2010-11)
Ms. Elaine Bunn (OSD, 2013-16)	GEN Lim Ho-Young (CFC, 2016-17)
GEN Walter Sharp (CFC, 2008-11)	LTG Lee Jung-Woong (RJCS, 2012-19)
GEN Curtis Scaparrotti (CFC, 2013-16)	Dr. Ham Hyeong-Pil (MND, 2014-19)
GEN Vincent Brooks (CFC, 2016-18)	GEN Kim Byung-Joo (CFC, 2017-19)

These interviews will provide contextual information strengthening the analysis, especially when discord is less observable through public pronouncements and cooperation may have existed without cohesion.

### **Potential Findings and Recommendations**

I expect to find evidence that the high level of cooperation in the ROK-US Alliance does not reflect a similar level of strategic cohesion. Specifically, I anticipate this study will reveal that despite strategic alignment and operational integration regarding how to fight a conventional war, there is significant discord about how to “wage deterrence” across the time-intensity spectrum of multi-domain competition in a multipolar nuclear environment. Further, the alliance’s nuclear deterrence-focused policy dialogues and military operational planning frameworks are no longer fit for purpose. The Alliance’s consultative mechanisms remain limited to explaining existing policy for assurance purposes, rather than being fora to address the potential need to change policy and strengthen deterrence against an evolving DPRK nuclear threat. The Alliance’s planning frameworks are consequently constrained by policy from tackling more directly issues related to nuclear operations, including the operationalization of the US nuclear umbrella.

If these hypotheses are supported by the research, likely policy recommendations would be to revamp the agenda of bilateral consultation mechanisms to reveal and address disparate approaches to nuclear-conventional integration, escalation management, and cross-domain deterrence operations; as well as to ensure greater focus on deterrence dynamics and alliance cohesion when implementing recent strategic policy guidance in the development of new strategic policy directives.

This research will also offer useful insights into where and how the United States might be able to support South Korea's efforts at realizing a non-nuclear strategic capability to deter nuclear powers despite the ROK military remaining a conventional force. This will have implications for potential cooperation in areas of emerging capabilities from hypersonics to advanced unmanned systems and artificial intelligence, as well as more generally for arms control and the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Finally, the findings should also help shed new light on the increasing public and non-government expert support in South Korea for an indigenous ROK nuclear capability, as well as on growing calls for the United States to redeploy battlefield nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula and establish a NATO-like nuclear sharing arrangement. The study will explain the military and political logic behind these positions and demonstrate how – contrary to common understanding – such calls do not reflect waning confidence and support in the ROK-US alliance. This study should also help inform alliance managers on how to achieve strategic cohesion, so that future ROK and US strategy design and force development more effectively leverage the potential of the ROK-US Alliance. Ultimately, this project aims to inform policy makers on how to modernize alliances with implications for deterrence in an increasingly tenuous strategic environment and for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

## 2. Linde Desmaele, MIT SSP

### *Dilemmas of a tripolar nuclear world: Implications for the US Extended Nuclear Deterrence Commitment to Europe*

#### Issue and importance

My project looks at the impact of the ongoing shift to a tripolar nuclear age on the United States' extended nuclear deterrence commitment to Europe. During the Cold War and post-Cold War period, US nuclear strategy was primarily concerned with the challenges of a nuclear-armed Soviet Union and nuclear non-major powers, respectively.<sup>5</sup> Today, in contrast, US strategists speak of the challenge of an evolving tripolar nuclear major power competition with both Russia (in Europe) and China (in Asia).<sup>6</sup> Thinking about US nuclear strategy now requires updated analytical tools to allow for the recognition of this structural predicament. Against this background, my project examines the nature of the linkages between the US extended nuclear commitments in Europe and Asia in said tripolar nuclear age. My goal is to help lessen uncertainty about US strategic intent and commitments to Europe. This has far-reaching consequences for European strategy, and eventually, for regional and global stability.

#### Research question

My project examines the following research question: What explains variation in the US evolving extended nuclear deterrence commitment to Europe?

My dependent variable is the US extended nuclear deterrence commitment to Europe as visible in the means and ends of US nuclear strategy (i.e. posture, structure and doctrine).

#### Research design

To answer my research question, I work deductively from the literature on deterrence theory (with a focus on extended nuclear deterrence) and alliance interdependence to develop the analytical framework outlined below. I subsequently apply this framework to demonstrate its added value in understanding variation in the US extended nuclear deterrence commitment to Europe between the Trump and Biden administration, respectively. Drawing upon a qualitative analysis of primary documents, secondary literature and interviews with US policymakers, I perform a structured focused comparison of those two cases.

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<sup>5</sup> Steven Miller and Alexey Arbatov (2019). 'The Rise and Decline of Global Nuclear Order?' in *Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age: Nuclear Weapons in a Changing Global Order*, Eds. Robert Legvold and Christopher Chyba, Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

<sup>6</sup> 2022 Space and Missile Defense Symposium, Speech by Adm. Charles Richard, available via <https://www.stratcom.mil/DesktopModules/ArticleCS/Print.aspx?PortalId=8&ModuleId=1541&Article=3126694>.

## Tentative argument

I make a two-pronged argument to explain variation in my dependent variable. First, building upon existing literature, I start from the assumption that US nuclear strategy is driven by both domestic factors (i.e. the ideological orientation of the administration in power with respect to the specific (dis)utility of nuclear weapons) and external factors (i.e. the bilateral nuclear and conventional balance of power between the US and a designated adversary).<sup>7</sup>

Second, I refine this assumption by arguing that in assessing the external drivers of US nuclear strategy, specifically, analysts today ought to move beyond an intra-regional analysis of the European balance of power to include an assessment of the Asian balance as well. This is the case because, from the viewpoint of the United States, what it does in one region exercises two sets of (at times conflicting) pressures on what it does in the other region. While the challenge of dealing with the reverberations of US strategy in Asia for Europe is not unprecedented, the shift from a relatively Eurocentric nuclear deterrence regime to a world in which the United States faces two nuclear peers creates a distinctly new set of dilemmas for US strategists, and hence, for US allies in Europe. Moreover, I argue that US nuclear strategy is embedded in a broader US defense strategy and grand strategy that prioritizes Asia.<sup>8</sup> This implies that the US commitment to Asia can be logically expected to have a larger impact on its commitment to Europe than vice versa.

More concretely, the shift to a tripolar nuclear world creates a set of inter-regional ordering pressures and a set of inter-regional resource allocation pressures for the United States. On the one hand, the United States' bilateral nuclear relationships in each region are subject to as well as help shape a global nuclear normative order, including expectations about nuclear restraint.<sup>9</sup> Thus, for instance, analysts have argued that the Trump administration's 2019 decision to withdraw from the bilateral Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia was at least partially driven by a US desire to develop systems to counter Chinese capability in this realm.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, the 2021 decision of the Biden administration to deliver a nuclear-powered submarine fleet to Australia within the framework of the AUKUS partnerships provoked criticism in some circles because of its potential negative impact on the global non-proliferation regime.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Elizabeth Saunders (2019). 'The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices – A Review Essay,' *International Security* 44(2): 146-184; Timothy McDonnell (2019). 'The Sources of US Nuclear Posture, 1945 to Present,' (PhD diss, MIT, 2019); Van Jackson (2022). 'Reducing or Exploiting Risk? Varieties of US Nuclear Thought and Their Implications for Northeast Asia,' *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 5(1): 185-198. Jackson identifies four types of nuclear thought in the United States: Arms control believers, nuclear traditionalists, future-of-war strategists and nuclear primacists.

<sup>8</sup> Luis Simon, Linde Desmaele and Jordan Becker (2021). 'Europe as a Secondary Theater? Competition with China and the Future of America's European Strategy,' *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 15(1): 90-115.

<sup>9</sup> Miller and Arbatov, 'The Rise and Decline of Global Nuclear Order?'; Nina Tannenwald, James Acton and Jane Vaynman (2019). 'The Great Unraveling: The Future of the Nuclear Normative Order', in *Meeting the Challenges of the New Nuclear Age*.

<sup>10</sup> Adam Taylor (2018). 'How China plays into Trump's decision to pull out of INF Treaty with Russia,' *The Washington Post*, 23 October 2018.

<sup>11</sup> Caitlin Talmadge (2021). 'Don't Sink the Nuclear Submarine Deal', *Foreign Affairs*, 27 September 2021.

In short, Asia-related considerations feed into US strategy, help shape the global nuclear normative order, and thereby also affect Europe.

On the other hand, changes in US resource allocations in one region also have an opportunity cost for the other region for the simple reason that resources – including policy-makers' attention – are limited.<sup>12</sup> If, for instance, the US increases its resource commitment to one region, it is compelled to either retrench the scope of its their existing commitments in the secondary region or place greater reliance on less expensive systems (such as nuclear weapons) to seek and maintain existing commitments. In the spirit of the former option, the United States has recently re-postured its navy from a 50-50% split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to a 60-40% split.<sup>13</sup> To be sure, the United States can also balance internally, i.e. increase resources in absolute terms. Yet, so can other actors too. In fact, once a major power engages in acts of internal balancing, it is reasonable to expect its adversaries to reciprocate. Moreover, internal balancing can only be a long-term strategy and cannot solve the challenge of resource tradeoffs in situations of immediate deterrence. This is especially relevant as US force planning is currently premised on a one-war standard.<sup>14</sup>

Taken together, this leads me to hypothesize that variation in the US evolving extended nuclear deterrence commitment to Europe is caused by a combination of the ideological orientation of the administration in power with respect to the (dis)utility of nuclear weapons on the one hand and the bilateral nuclear and conventional balance of power in both Europe and Asia on the other hand.

#### Contribution and alternative explanations

The key contribution of my project is that it moves beyond an intra-regional analysis and provides a framework to account for the impact of the ongoing three-cornered rivalry on the evolution of the US nuclear commitment to Europe. In doing so, I contribute to the growing literature that debates the connections between US commitments in Europe and Asia.

On the one hand, scholars who focus on US credibility and reputation often portray the links between both regions as mutually reinforcing and reject the notion of resource tradeoffs.<sup>15</sup> Such arguments were perhaps somewhat plausible during the Cold War when the United States faced a single nuclear competitor – the Soviet Union – in both Europe and Asia. Insofar as any efforts to alter the regional power balance to the US advantage put pressure on the Soviet Union to respond (and vice versa), there was no real risk of neglecting the other region.<sup>16</sup> This is not the case in today's tripolar nuclear world. With two

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<sup>12</sup> Hal Brands and Evan Montgomery (2020). 'One War is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition', *Texas National Security Review* 3(2): 80-92.

<sup>13</sup> BBC (2012). 'Leon Panetta: US to deploy 60% of navy fleet to Pacific,' 2 June 2012.

<sup>14</sup> Brands and Montgomery, 'One War is Not Enough.'

<sup>15</sup> Luis Simon and Tongfi Kim (2021). 'A Reputation versus Prioritization Trade-off: Unpacking Allies Perceptions of US Extended Deterrence in Distant Regions,' *Security Studies* 30(5): 725-760.

<sup>16</sup> Luis Simon (2022). 'Bridging US-Led Alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific: An Inter-theater Perspective,' Center for Strategic & International Studies.



identified nuclear major power adversaries in two regions, changes to the US commitment in one region will have an opportunity costs for its commitment to the other region.

At the same time, scholars who focus on resource tradeoffs tend to view the US multi-regional commitments as wholly competitive.<sup>17</sup> My argument seeks to overcome this dichotomy and recognizes that the interdependence between both regions is complex, and that the US extended nuclear deterrence commitment in Asia exercises several, potentially conflicting pressures upon the US commitment to Europe.<sup>18</sup> Elements of my analysis are applicable to analyze the sources of variation in the US commitment to Asia accordingly.

### Policy implications

My project brings theory to issues of immense current relevance and hopes to encourage European policymakers to think of the US extended nuclear deterrence commitment in a three-cornered framework. My purpose is not to address whether this commitment is suitable nor effective. Such judgement ultimately lies in the eye of the beholder. Instead, I seek to increase transparency about the dynamics at play to help tell Europeans where to look for them to proactively shape their security environment in the tripolar nuclear age.

A deteriorating regional security environment has put questions related to the role and modalities of deterrence – including questions related to the wisdom of relying on the US protection and the US nuclear umbrella – back atop the European political agenda in recent years.<sup>19</sup> America’s European allies have relied on the US extended nuclear deterrence commitment since the beginning of the Cold War. While the nuclear dimension of the US commitment is but part of a broader deterrence strategy covering the spectrum of potential nuclear and non-nuclear scenarios in defense of its allies, it has fundamental consequences for doctrines, capability choices and arms control and disarmament policies on both sides of the Atlantic. Wisely or not, the US nuclear umbrella is considered the backbone of NATO’s deterrence posture in Europe. As such, gathering a more thorough understanding of the US evolving extended nuclear deterrence commitment to Europe is a sine qua non for any honest reflection on the future of European security.

### Challenges and weaknesses

A major weakness of the project is its attempt to strike the right balance between explaining the unique elements of the US nuclear commitment to Europe in reality and to provide a more generalizable framework to address issues of regional linkages in US nuclear strategy. In addition, my implicit assumption that it is possible to isolate the causal impact of nuclear major power tripolarity from the continuing challenge posed by nuclear non-major powers needs be unpacked to assess its plausibility.

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Simon and Kim, ‘A Reputation versus Prioritization Trade-off’

<sup>19</sup> Bruno Tertrais (2019). ‘Will Europe Get Its Own Bomb?’, *Washington Quarterly* 42(2): 47-66.

Finally, as my project is concerned with a sensitive national security issue, gathering reliable and sufficient data poses a typical problem.

### 3. Jacklyn Majnemer, MIT SSP

#### *Foreign Nuclear Deployments and Nuclear Sharing*

##### **On what nuclear security issue are you working and why is it important?**

I research foreign nuclear deployments (FND) and nuclear weapons sharing. This topic is important for several reasons. Nuclear deployments were a fundamental part of the Cold War nuclear order. According to Fuhrmann and Sechser's FND dataset, twenty-three different states hosted foreign nuclear weapons, amounting to thousands of nuclear weapons stationed across the globe. While these numbers decreased substantially by the end of the Cold War, some FND have persisted, with Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey continuing to host American nuclear weapons today. Only a handful of scholars have addressed the causes and consequences of foreign nuclear deployments theoretically, leaving a wide gap. With rising global instability, the relevancy of current FND, and the prospects of a new one, have substantially increased. For example, in recent years, there has been speculation about new American FND in South Korea or different NATO allies, and Russian FND in Belarus. More research is needed to determine whether FND are stabilizing or destabilizing; provide reassurance to allies or embolden them; and increase alliance cohesion or dissensus among allies.

##### **What is the big question that you are seeking to answer about that issue?**

How do host states affect foreign nuclear deployments? More specifically, I will explore two aspects of this question: 1) How the nature of the FND arrangement can vary depending on the host, and 2) How potential hosts states can affect FND outcomes, by refusing to host foreign nuclear weapons on their soil.

##### **How are you going to answer your question? What methods will you use and what evidence or cases will you explore?**

I will rely on qualitative methods and archival data collection. During the fellowship, archival material will be collected from: FRUS, the NATO archives, the Eisenhower Presidential Library, the Kennedy Presidential Library, and the US National Archives.

For the first aspect, I will collect data on different cases of FND, using Fuhrmann and Sechser's dataset as a starting point. I will pay special attention to the nature of the different arrangements, assessing the points of commonality and difference. I will concentrate on American cases of FND, due to the greater availability of data, as well as the large number of

host states to analyze. Because of the limitations on data access/cases, the Russian and British cases of FND will serve as shadow case studies, which will test the generalizability of my conceptualization based on the American case.

For the second aspect, I will focus on a subset of FND arrangements: NATO dual-key nuclear sharing. Because of the archival material available and the American commitment to obtain host state consent before deployment to NATO allies, NATO provides a useful subset of cases for exploring how and why host states can affect FND outcomes by refusing hosting offers. The patterns of deployment in NATO also represent a puzzle for Fuhrmann and Sechser's findings on the causes of FND, as NATO allies should be likely candidates for American nuclear deployments: They are all American allies, which share a common rival (USSR), in relatively close proximity to that rival. Yet, six out of fifteen Cold War NATO allies did not host American nuclear weapons. This paper will use comparative case studies, selecting cases of acceptance, refusal, and where no offer was made. For cases where no offer is made, the reasons for why the US refrained are important: did they anticipate a refusal or were they not interested in the host for strategic reasons?

### **What is your (tentative) answer to the question you are asking?**

My preliminary research on American FND reveals three dimensions on which these arrangements can vary: host state consent, level of secrecy, and host state responsibility and control. My initial findings suggest that this variation of FND arrangements is related to donor state's perceptions of host state sovereignty, which, in turn, were related to colonial legacies between the deployer and host.

1. Host State Consent: In some cases, host states needed to agree to have nuclear weapons stationed on their soil. In other cases, these weapons were deployed covertly without the knowledge of the host. For example, the US lobbied the Canadian government for years before finally getting formal approval for nuclear weapons to be stationed there; however, evidence suggests that nuclear weapons were stored in the Philippines without first consulting the Philippine government.
2. Level of Secrecy: A covert deployment is when no host state actor has knowledge of the nuclear weapons on their soil. However, even with knowledge of the deployment, the level of secrecy can vary. In some cases, only the leader or a small set of officials know about the weapons. In other cases, the nuclear weapons are public knowledge and politicized.
3. Host State Responsibility and Control: While covert deployments would entail no host state involvement, outside these cases, there is variation. The NATO dual-key nuclear sharing arrangement requires the host state to supply nuclear-capable delivery systems and have their military personnel trained to use nuclear weapons. This degree of involvement differed from that of other American allied nuclear hosts, such as South Korea and Taiwan,

where the host state did not have a role in the delivery of the weapons, nor supplied delivery systems.

The NATO nuclear sharing arrangement is an interesting combination of these variables: with host state consent being necessary, a relatively 'open' level of secrecy, and a high degree of host state responsibility and control. I expect that most NATO refusals to host American nuclear weapons were driven by domestic considerations: the presence of strong anti-nuclear or nationalist coalitions that opposed nuclear sharing. This does not mean that I completely discount the role of strategic or security factors: I expect to find that these factors explain host state acceptance and American motivations for offering FND to particular NATO hosts in the first place. However, I suspect that the Americans were also sensitive to potential negative domestic effects of FND in certain cases, which may have prevented them from making offers to otherwise strategically valuable hosts, anticipating that their offer would likely be rejected and cause instability within the alliance.

### **How does your work fit into the existing work on your subject?**

Most work on FNDs focuses on specific historical accounts or policy debates around NATO nuclear sharing. Recently, a few scholars have analyzed the causes and effects of FNDs more theoretically. My research develops this work along three themes:

**The Multifaceted Nature of FND:** Usually, FND are conceptualized as a binary concept: either a nuclear power deploys weapons abroad, or it does not; either a state hosts nuclear weapons, or it does not. While this is a valid way to conceptualize FND, it also limits analysis, allowing for important questions and nuances to be overlooked. For certain host states, FND could be considered part of their 'nuclear posture,' even if they do not have independent nuclear weapons of their own, potentially changing their behavior on the international stage. However, this would not be the case for all nuclear hosts, especially those that have no knowledge of these deployments or little say over how they will be used. For the deployer state, important questions remain about how many and what kinds of weapons get deployed abroad. Beyond implications for nuclear security research, the existence of covert nuclear deployments challenges commonly held understandings about the robustness of sovereignty norms in the post-WWII era.

**The Role of the Host State and FND Outcomes:** The role of the host state has still not been robustly examined as a cause of FND outcomes. Usually, the focus is on the deployer state's motivations or more generally on the strategic causes of deployment. Fuhrmann and Sechser argue that the causes of FND are related to "the protection of allies and the projection of

military power.”<sup>20</sup> Under these models, potential hosts accept foreign nuclear weapons due to their relative insecurity/vulnerability or because they were not given the choice in the first place. Reiter adds another dimension, suggesting that states may refuse to FND if they fear entrapment, driving them to pursue an independent arsenal rather than ‘share’ that of another state.<sup>21</sup> I argue that this strategic/security model is not sufficient for understanding host state motivations and FND outcomes. In particular, these models cannot explain why the United States stationed nuclear weapons in certain NATO allies, but not others. I will argue that this is because the previous literature has not systematically examined the role of domestic politics on decisions to host foreign nuclear weapons. Adding these variables to existing models will allow for better predictions and explanations for FND outcomes.

**The Domestic Costs (and Benefits?) of FND:** Two scholars have focused on the strategic costs of FND. Avey analyzes their potential to instigate crises; Reiter explores the entrapment costs of FND.<sup>22</sup> I examine another type of cost: the domestic costs of FND. My previous research on the Canadian case demonstrates that leaders in potential hosts are acutely aware of the political nature of FND. In the case of Canada, Prime Minister Diefenbaker delayed nuclear acquisition because of his concerns about instigating an anti-nuclear backlash. During the 1963 election, Diefenbaker tried to portray the rejection of FND as a way to stand up against the United States and affirm Canada’s sovereignty. In the end, it was the perception that Diefenbaker was reneging on important commitments, abandoning allies, and damaging Canada’s reputation that generated the most public backlash, leading to Diefenbaker’s electoral defeat. This case shows that FND are important political symbols, and that the decision to host or refuse can stem beyond strategic calculations. Furthermore, it shows that the effects of FND go beyond the strategic realm and can affect the domestic politics of the host state, which can have implications for alliance relations.

**What policy implications flow from your work? What concrete recommendations can you offer to policymakers?**

My work will show that to make predictions about future FND, one needs to pay attention to both strategic factors related the potential host, such as alliance membership and their proximity to the deployer’s rival, as well as domestic factors, such as the presence of anti-nuclear or nationalist coalitions. FND can have domestic implications that can reverberate back into the international realm. For example, an offer of FND may ultimately be destabilizing for

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<sup>20</sup> Fuhrmann, M. and Sechser, T.S. (2014) ‘Nuclear Strategy, Nonproliferation, and the Causes of Foreign Nuclear Deployments’, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58(3): 455.

<sup>21</sup> Reiter, D. (2014) ‘Security Commitments and Nuclear Proliferation’, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 10(1), pp. 61–80.

<sup>22</sup> Avey, P.C. (2018) ‘The Historical Rarity of Foreign-Deployed Nuclear Weapon Crises’, *Security Studies*, 27(1), pp. 89–119; Reiter (2014).

alliance cohesion if the potential host is governed by a nationalist leader or coalition, which would see these weapons as an affront to their sovereignty. Policy makers should therefore pay attention to the domestic context in the host state before making FND offers.

**What do you think is the weakest or most vulnerable aspect of your study and what sort of feedback would be most useful to you?**

One of my greatest concerns relates to data collection. While some material related to American FND has been declassified, it is likely that a substantial portion remains classified. Furthermore, most of my archival work will be concentrated in the US at this point in the project, which limits the scope of my analysis. I would like feedback on methodology, especially case selection. I also welcome feedback on the policy implications of my work.