1. Mansoor Ahmed, BCSIA

Pakistan's Nuclear Inheritance: Personalities, Politics and Proliferation

Objectives

My research project seeks to analyze the impact of bureaucratic-politics and myth making within Pakistan’s nuclear establishment as a driver or impediment of vertical nuclear proliferation, through five decades of the country’s nuclear development (1956-2015). The prevalent literature on the subject is largely deficient of domestic determinants of the nuclear proliferation process, hence the rationale for this study.

Overview

The discourse on Pakistan’s nuclear program is primarily geared towards two dominant themes: the perceived security threat from India as the overriding external driver; and/or the role of A Q Khan—first as the perceived father of the country’s nuclear program—and more recently as the architect of an illicit nuclear proliferation network. Although a fairly comprehensive account is out there in the shape of Eating Grass, but it leaves much unsaid. Yet it, and the larger narrative on the program does not provide a holistic explanation of the domestic determinants and internal drivers of the vertical proliferation process that led to the acquisition of nuclear capability and eventually shaped Pakistan’s nuclear behavior and its evolving nuclear posture. Ever since the inception of the nuclear program in 1956, Pakistan’s nuclear decision-making has suffered from fragmentation, polarization and bureaucratic tussling among various domestic stakeholders within the nuclear and civil-military establishment. During the first fifteen years of the program and subsequently, organizational interests

---


(civil, military and scientific) were personified by individuals who competed amongst themselves as “players in a central competitive game”\textsuperscript{3} and sought to promote their “own peculiar set of parochial priorities and perceptions; stakes and stands on issues, and goals and interests” that collectively constituted various competing versions of the national interest. Once the “proliferation decision” following the defeat in the 1971 war led to the ascendancy of the bomb lobby in the country, decision-making continued to be “a bargain amongst these players who are positioned at various levels within a government.”\textsuperscript{4} This produced a cadre of national elites, comprising politicians and scientists, who as strategic mythmakers began to equate the survival of the country with the acquisition of nuclear weapons and promoted it as a means of achieving military security, political power and influence by cultivating their personal goals and careers that became synonymous with the nuclear program itself.\textsuperscript{5} -- such as the long-time heads the PAEC and KRL—Munir Ahmad Khan and A. Q. Khan.

Even as they symbolized the country's nuclear ambitions, their long-standing and bitter rivalry for power, prestige, resources and political patronage—at times encouraged by the state—resulted in inefficient outcomes in terms of stunted and delayed fissile material production such as the delayed completion of the plutonium route by ten years and slow progress in HEU production for a decade; parallel weapon design and ballistic missile programs; stagnant growth in civil nuclear energy, and most significantly the rise of an illicit proliferation network of centrifuge and bomb designs led by A. Q. Khan—of which Pakistan was only the first customer. The command and control dilemmas associated with Pakistan’s nuclear quest are therefore a function of this rivalry, with the floodgates of illicit proliferation opening up in the late 1980s. Despite such ad-hoc decision-making, Pakistan succeeded in producing a recessed deterrent by the late 1980s. After the May 1998 tests and beyond, the long-standing need for a command and control set-up saw fruition with the formation of the Strategic Plans Division. Nonetheless, the tradition of strategic mythmaking continues to fuel nuclear nationalism within the country and technological maturation.

**Research Design and Expected Final Product**

The project is qualitative, that relies on primary source material comprising documentary, interview and unpublished sources for its information. I intend to use deductive reasoning to build my theoretical framework that draws heavily on the bureaucratic-politics decision-making and myth-making models and then apply these on three consistent themes underlying my research—firstly technical development involving the entire spectrum of the country’s nuclear development, ranging from the nuclear fuel cycle to energy to nuclear weapons and missiles; internal rivalries and competing power centers, primarily within the nuclear establishment (PAEC and KRL) and the civil-military tussling for control); its impact on the policy choices (prioritization of fuel cycle and weapon related projects HEU vs. Pu) and technical outcomes (stunted/inefficient fissile material production and duplication of effort in ballistic missiles); secondly how this bureaucratic/organizational tussling contributed to the genesis of the A. Q. Khan


\textsuperscript{4} Ibid.

network from within the country’s nuclear program; and thirdly a political analysis of how myth-making perpetuated a personality cult around A. Q. Khan that personified him as the symbol of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions—helped by frequent nuclear rhetoric at home that provided sustenance to the illicit proliferation network and prevented the state from holding him accountable, before and after it was busted. Most importantly, it skewed the narrative—both domestic and international as seeing the country’s program only through his lens or that of the illicit network which he headed.

Therefore, the key strength of this study will be the employment of unpublished primary source data—comprising personal diaries, letters, and personal interviews of some of the key players in both PAEC and KRL in accurately navigating through the maze of existing literature, and de-classified documents and in validating the prevalent and established Pakistani and international narrative on the subject.

At a minimum, I expect the above research to result in a book publication from a university press (for which I have prepared a tentative book outline), coupled with an article in a peer reviewed international journal.

Expected Results

This study will attempt to establish two broad revisionist propositions: Domestic drivers for the proliferation process were as critical to the emergence of Pakistan as a nuclear power as was the perceived external security threat from India. Second, the success of the illicit proliferation network as a byproduct of bureaucratic tussling was largely possible due to the immense influence of mythmaking that dominated Pakistan’s nuclear enclave and persists to this day.

Target Audience and Contribution to the Policy Process

The findings of this study should be of interest to both scholars and practitioners of international relations and the nuclear proliferation debate. What makes this study unique is that no other proliferation case study experienced such intense levels of enduring tussling within the strategic enclave itself while grappling with resource constraints, international sanctions and a perpetually fluid and hostile regional environment. The project, therefore, has the potential to contribute to the literature in terms of the application of the two theoretical approaches outlined above, which uniquely fit into Pakistan’s case. For policymakers and practitioners, it brings forth lessons that can be applied to other nuclear aspirants and might help in predicting similar outcomes in other states that may seek WMD technologies or give rise to autonomous interest groups within the state that essentially derive their legitimacy through invoking the threat to national security while enriching themselves at state expense—as was seen in the illicit proliferation from within Pakistan’s program. The study also has direct relevance in understanding Pakistan’s current policy choices such as blocking the FMCT negotiations at the CD and the country’s emerging nuclear posture, particularly in the shape of tactical nuclear weapons and full spectrum deterrence as a product of decisions and choices made decades earlier that were determined in part by bureaucratic politics and the personal ambitions of nuclear decision-makers. This should help in arriving at a better understanding of Pakistan’s past and present nuclear behavior and in predicting potential future pathways and policy choices in a culture that has
fostered one constant determinant—personalized decision-making and group interests as a personification of organizational and the national interest.
2. Galen Jackson, MIT

The Consequences of Nuclearization: Israel’s Acquisition of the Bomb and the Politics of the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1979

Objectives: My project seeks to understand the political effects of nuclearization by examining how Israel’s acquisition of atomic weapons affected Arab, especially Egyptian, diplomacy. Using historical evidence, I investigate whether Jerusalem’s procurement of the Bomb influenced Cairo’s decision to accept a peaceful settlement to the conflict. This study has important implications for contemporary debates over nonproliferation policy and the political utility of nuclear weapons.

Overview: In recent years, scholars have attempted to study the effects of nuclearization using statistical methods. Through the construction of large-N data sets, they argue, it is possible to draw reliable conclusions about this issue. This approach, however, is potentially misleading—any analysis of a data set of “nuclear crises” inevitably fails to include those instances in which crises did not occur because challenges to nuclear powers were not mounted in the first place. As international relations theorists like James Fearon point out, by ignoring the “dogs that do not bark,” these studies systematically overlook an entire class of cases relevant to the study of the political consequences of nuclearization. By now, many in the field understand this problem.

Another way to get a handle on this issue is to employ historical methods. Without an examination of relevant primary sources, one cannot determine whether states have been deterred from initiating challenges to nuclear-armed adversaries. And if one can demonstrate that in a particular instance nuclearization did impact a state’s decision-making behavior, then it must be acknowledged that going nuclear can matter, a point with far-reaching theoretical and policy implications.

With this in mind, my project focuses on one such case. Specifically, I investigate the ways in which Israel’s acquisition of a nuclear capability in the late 1960s affected the politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. At present, little is known about this important aspect of the Middle East dispute. Moreover, there are only a few instances in nuclear history that are readily examinable in which “the dog did not bark,” meaning this particular case takes on added significance.

While I would not be the first researcher to examine the topic, the extant literature in this area suffers from two problems. First, the various claims that have been made about the impact of Israel’s nuclear arsenal are largely unsupported by a close reading of the historical evidence. Although other scholars have previously debated this case, their findings, for the most part, lack a strong evidentiary


Second, the existing research is narrow in scope. The great bulk of the literature focuses mainly on the role that Israel’s nuclear capability played during the wars of June 1967 and October 1973, thereby ignoring the important events that both preceded and followed those conflicts. In short, this is an area that is ripe for further investigation, particularly given the continued political significance of the Middle East in contemporary world affairs.

Research Design: I intend to study this issue systematically by using thousands of primary documents, many of which have only recently been declassified and have never before been examined. This includes American archival material—a great deal of which I have already collected at the presidential libraries of Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter, and at the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress—as well as published primary source collections and records that are now easily accessible through online repositories like the Digital National Security Archive and Cold War International History Project.

More importantly, I will also be working with Arabic sources. Since the key question I plan to examine is how Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons influenced the Arabs’ political strategy, conducting this project would be impossible without using such materials. To be sure, there is not much in the way of archival material on the Arab side available to researchers. Nevertheless, there are many Arabic memoirs, especially Egyptian, from which key insights can be gleaned. Arabic newspapers and periodicals from this era are also of value, as many of them represented their governments’ official views. Finally, I intend to conduct interviews with former officials and experts in this area.

Expected Results: My preliminary findings suggest that although the nuclear element was by no means the only or most significant factor influencing Egyptian diplomatic strategy, it nevertheless played a key role in Cairo’s overall calculus. My expectation is that Israel’s nuclearization of the Middle East dispute contributed to the Arabs’ moderation of their negotiating posture and to their acceptance of the need for a political settlement to the conflict.

Target Audience and Policy Contribution: The matter of how to deal with the issue of nuclear proliferation is among the most important policy problems confronting the United States today. Central to the debate on this topic is the question of how great an effort American strategists ought to make in


order to prevent non-nuclear states from acquiring atomic weapons. This dilemma, of course, cannot be adequately addressed without dealing with the basic conceptual question of how nuclearization impacts political behavior and foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, before a determination on the matter of proliferation can be made, one must understand how going nuclear affects a state’s ability to deter or coerce its adversaries and, more fundamentally, how it impacts—if at all—the way the political conflicts in which it is involved run their course. Given the ongoing discussion regarding how the United States should deal with the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program, the need to answer these questions is tremendously important in policy terms.

My project should also be of interest to scholars. Researchers continue to debate the political utility of nuclear weapons and it seems likely that this issue will remain a central question in the field for the foreseeable future. More fundamentally, there has been relatively little work done on how states respond to their adversaries’ nuclearization and, thus, the Israeli case is especially significant. Finally, this study raises key methodological questions with which scholars must continue to grapple in order to continue to move the field forward.
3. Andreas Lutsch, CISAC

*West Germany's Nuclear Policy (1961-1979) - A Reappraisal & A History of Nuclear Consultation in NATO*

**Objectives**

First, I will present a reappraisal of West Germany’s nuclear policy from the controversy about the NPT until the agreement on NATO’s dual track decision (1961-1979), based on my defended PhD dissertation. Second, I will analyze nuclear consultation in NATO as a tool to manage U.S. extended nuclear deterrence during the Cold War by identifying and assessing important experiences in a structured and non-chronological way. These experiences remain particularly relevant to current challenges.

**Overview**

**Project (1): West Germany’s Nuclear Policy (1961-1979) - A Reappraisal**

Since its foundation in 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was a revisionist state, committed by law to achieve the unity of Germany. As a non-nuclear member state of NATO that had waived the right to produce atomic weapons on its soil, Bonn’s nuclear policy had widespread repercussions on international politics and significant implications for the stability between the Cold War blocs. When West Germany approached the nuclear sphere of security policy since the mid-1950s this raised the “most fundamental question of the Cold War – the political and military status of Germany”\(^{11}\). Throughout the 1960s, when international nonproliferation efforts accelerated towards the establishment of the NPT regime, “the German question was at the heart of almost all discussions over what to do about proliferation”\(^{12}\).

Many scholars contend that Bonn actively sought to transform non-nuclear West Germany into an atomic power and that it had the industrial, technological and financial capability to do it. In particular, this view is related to the late 1950s and early 1960s and it fortified a common belief: the German nuclear question came to an end when the FRG acceded to the NPT by signing the treaty in late 1969 after a change of government which heralded the beginning of Bonn’s ‘New Ostpolitik’ in the era of détente.\(^{13}\)

---


I present a different narrative. Basically, I agree with another school of thought according to which there was “ample and growing capacity” for “an autonomous [nuclear] weapons acquisition program” in the West German case, “but no will”. But my view goes beyond this conventional wisdom. I show how the position of West Germany as a NNWS bound to the West was fixed during the 1960s and preserved until 1979. Particular emphasis is devoted to reveal how West Germany tried to accomplish her interests regarding nuclear strategy and arms control within NATO and later on also by bridging the East-West division.

I reappraise this complicated topic by introducing the analytical concept of West Germany’s limited nuclear revisionism, defined as: A political strategy of an ‘umbrella state’ within the framework of U.S. extended deterrence and NATO, that is disaffected with the status quo and that continuously seeks to achieve incremental enhancements to its position and influence within the nuclear order – but on a limited scale, that is without becoming an atomic power under the conditions of the Cold War, and while referring to and thus sheltering behind its legal status as a NNWS. Thereby, I postulate that the NPT had no nonproliferation effect regarding West Germany. Moreover, I argue that the German nuclear question was not ‘solved’ when West Germany acceded to the NPT in 1969/1975 (signing/ratification). I demonstrate that the German nuclear question referred to the question whether West Germany was sufficiently assured by the U.S. nuclear umbrella to sustain its given ties to the West or whether it considered an alternative security policy (a national deterrent excluded) because U.S. extended deterrence either appeared as incredible and/or dangerous in light of German interests.

**Project (2): A History of Nuclear Consultation in NATO**

Many scholars agree that mechanisms of nuclear consultation, especially in the framework of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) since 1967, were pivotal to managing U.S. extended nuclear deterrence (END) in Europe. Most accounts highlight the ‘NPG effect’ with regards to the German nuclear question: After years of speculation about Bonn’s nuclear ambitions, West Germany accepted her position in the nuclear order since 1967, including permanent membership in the NPG; subsequently, this position was codified by Germany’s accession to the NPT regime.

Apart from paucity of historical accounts on related processes, there is a lack of knowledge as to whether, why and to what extent nuclear consultation had in fact been pivotal to manage U.S. END in Europe during the Cold War. There are only a few accounts on this topic, most of which were written during the Cold War by political scientists. Nowadays, declassified files from the UK, the U.S. and Germany allow scholars to analyze, for example, NPG consultations. These consultations were related to key issues, such as stability, strategy, requirements of extended deterrence and arms control. A careful

and balanced assessment of the history of nuclear consultation in NATO, of its dynamics, limitations and self-induced problems is a desideratum.

This effort rests on three premises. First, nuclear consultation was never a panacea; it was one instrument of END management within a spectrum of tools, such as declaratory policy, force posture (nuclear, non-nuclear/ quality, quantity/ forward deployment, rotation etc.), or nuclear sharing arrangements. Second, there is a need to differentiate between distinct layers of consultation, such as: official (track 1) or semi-official (track 1.5) consultations on varying levels of seniority; multilateral or bilateral frameworks; occasional or institutionalized forms. Finally, the literature has so far portrayed the idea of engaging West Germany in nuclear consultation as a best practice example for the postulated effectiveness of nuclear consultation as a tool to manage END.

The focus of this effort is twofold. First, considering the increasingly complicated and challenging assurance demands of U.S. protégés under the conditions of MAD and strategic ‘parity’ between the superpowers since the late 1960s, I will focus on the effects of nuclear consultation in terms of assurance of U.S. allies; concerning this matter, scholars have so far understood the practice of nuclear consultation as a success story.\(^1\) Second, I will address the impact of U.S. END on arms control and nonproliferation; in this regard, many experts argue or tend to believe that U.S. END had (and/or continues to have) at least a certain nonproliferation effect vis-à-vis U.S. allies in (Western) Europe and East Asia - in a nutshell: that it limits the spread of nuclear weapons.\(^2\)

**Research Design**

Both projects are based on a qualitative, historical and empirically oriented approach in order to develop explanations for complex problems of international and nuclear history. This approach avails itself of declassified files and material from more than 20 archives in the U.S., the UK, Belgium and Germany. My dissertation offers a reappraisal of Bonn’s nuclear policy during the 1960s and 1970s with a focus on the politico-diplomatic-military sphere, on decision makers and administrative elites, on their perceptions, analyses and decisions. I represent the German nuclear question as a multipolar issue in the treatment of which at least the three Western nuclear powers and the Soviet Union were involved all the time.

Within the scope of the project on a history of nuclear consultation in NATO I will identify and assess experiences with this tool in a structured, non-chronological, thesis-driven and rather parsimonious way. In light of the availability of relevant archival records, the timeline will be from the early 1960s until the early 1980s. In order to raise my awareness of relevant experiences with this tool in the 21st century, I will also interview at least some experts from the think tank community and senior officials; I already conducted five interviews at the NATO HQ, Brussels, and at the foreign office and ministry of defense in Berlin.

\(^{1\text{a}}}\) David S. Yost, “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO,” *International Affairs* 85, no. 4 (2009), pp. 755-780.

\(^{1\text{b}}}\) Jeffrey W. Knopf (ed.), *Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation* (Stanford: SUP, 2012).
**Expected Final Product**

First, I expect to conclude the preparations to publish my PhD dissertation as a book (in German). Second, I expect at least one article on key findings of my thesis to be accepted for publication in a peer-reviewed journal. Finally, I expect my research on the history of nuclear consultation in NATO to result in one peer-reviewed journal article as well as in the form of an op-ed in a highly visible, policy-related outlet.

**Target Audience and Contribution to the Policy Process**

The findings of my research should be of interest to historians, political scientists, to practitioners of international relations and to persons who assist or have a bearing on the latter. This applies to communities in the U.S., Europe and East Asia.

U.S. extended deterrence requires careful historical analysis. Historical findings have a great impact on our thinking about related contemporary issues given the U.S. level of ambition: maintaining deterrence for the sake of strategic stability and assurance of U.S. allies, and promoting nonproliferation policy and the goal of global nuclear disarmament at the same time. Besides the growing importance of U.S. extended deterrence in East Asia due to the rise of China and an assertive North Korea, Russian revisionism in the Ukraine crisis posed an unexpected challenge to the U.S. guaranteed security architecture in Europe. The management of existing U.S. extended deterrence relationships remains a crucial task with nuclear consultation mechanisms playing important roles. This was highlighted by NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture Review report (DDPR) in 2012 and by the establishment of U.S. extended deterrence dialogues with Japan and the Republic of Korea in 2010. The latter indicates a certain prominence of nuclear consultation as a tool to manage U.S. extended deterrence under totally different circumstances compared to Europe – in a maritime theater and without forward-based U.S. nuclear weapons or nuclear sharing.

This research will exercise care with regards to presenting concrete policy-recommendations. It is devoted to foster solid and objective historical knowledge. Such knowledge is a treasure trove of experience in dealing with cardinal questions of extended deterrence, strategy, and arms control. This research can stimulate a better understanding of current political challenges. It can spur a hard-headed way of thinking about the gains, costs and relative utility of certain political instruments, such as nuclear consultation. Thus, this research can contribute to weigh policy options more precisely in order to shape an unpredictable future under conditions of uncertainty.
**4. Rohan Mukherjee, MIT**

*Rising Powers and the Quest for Status: The Case of India's Nuclear Program*

**Research Objective**

The desire for prestige is often cited as a reason why some countries seek the bomb, but existing research on this subject does a poor job of conceptualizing prestige and showing how and when it matters for a country’s nuclear decision-making. Using the case of India since the 1950s, I aim to explore the role that Delhi’s desire for status—or relative prestige—with regard to the great powers has played in shaping the country’s nuclear program over time.

**Project Overview**

In the study of international nuclear politics, the dominant explanations for the pursuit and acquisition of nuclear weapons focus on external security threats, domestic political compulsions, and individual psychological traits. A handful of studies emphasize the role of prestige, whereby nuclear technology and weapons are viewed as “international normative symbols of modernity and identity,” or nuclear prestige is equated with national pride.

While prestige is a useful concept, it leads to simplistic and under-theorized notions of why countries might pursue nuclear weapons. Given that the desire for prestige does not admit to much variation—countries are unlikely to ever not feel national pride—the empirical record throws up important puzzles. For example, if nuclear weapons are viewed as symbols of modernity, why did more post-colonial nations not pursue them in the 1950s and 1960s? If developing or acquiring the bomb contributes to national pride, why do we not see more countries pursuing nuclear weapons throughout the Cold War and even today?

Some scholars have offered answers to these questions that hinge on changes in international norms surrounding nuclear weapons, or the growing strength of the international regime for the control of nuclear proliferation. If prestige matters in addition to these factors, then there must be certain conditions under which it decisively impacts the decision of a country to pursue or not pursue the bomb.

---


But given that the desire for prestige does not admit to much variation, prestige alone may be an insufficient concept for understanding nuclear proliferation.

A small but growing body of international relations scholarship relying on insights from social psychology has emphasized the concept of status in understanding the behavior of states with regard questions of strategic decision-making and war. While prestige refers to a belief that a country has about itself, status arises from a country’s belief regarding what other countries believe about it. Prestige can be increased through unilateral action, while status is fundamentally contingent on the perceptions of others and is therefore harder to control. Thus while a focus on prestige leads to simplistic predictions about the drive for nuclear weapons, a focus on status leads to more nuanced hypotheses about when and how a country’s desire for recognition will play a role in its foreign and security policies.

The key insight from this literature is that under certain conditions the pursuit of nuclear weapons might enhance a country’s status while at other times the avoidance or renunciation of nuclear weapons might achieve the same outcome. Empirically, therefore, it is possible to explain why countries that care about status do not always simply pursue nuclear weapons, or why all countries do not pursue nuclear weapons for reasons of national pride. In this manner, one can refine the arguments of those who argue that prestige matters for understanding nuclear proliferation.

Research Design

My project focuses on rising powers because they are likely to be more susceptible to concerns of status than other types of countries—in particular, the status of becoming a great power, i.e. gaining entry into the global club of most powerful countries.

To investigate the role that status plays in shaping nuclear behavior, I examine the case of India from the 1950s onward. To date, there has been no satisfactory explanation of the motives behind India’s nuclear weapons program or the timing of its nuclear tests. The best histories of India’s tryst with the atom since independence in 1947 continue to grapple with three basic puzzles. First, why did India—faced with a nuclear China from 1964 onward—choose to conduct a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 and not sooner when it had the capability to put together an atomic bomb within a reasonable timeframe after the early 1960s? Second, after testing its first device in 1974, why did India not take any action toward developing a nuclear weapons program until the late 1980s? Third, why did India opt for weaponization in 1989 and a second round of nuclear tests in 1998 at a time when proliferation might have entailed heavy economic and social sanctions? Existing explanations of India’s nuclear decision-making—on a similar track to the broader field—focus on four sets of explanations: security threats, domestic politics,


individual psychological traits, and prestige. Preliminary investigations suggest that each of these explanations fall short at various points in India’s nuclear history.

To devise an alternative explanation based on status, I rely on the social psychology literature (and recent IR scholarship based on it) to devise one major hypothesis: Contingent on there being a global regime for the control of nuclear weapons—emerging in the early 1960s and gaining strength over time—India’s nuclear decision-making reflects Delhi’s perception of its status within this international regime, particularly with regard to the great powers, including China. When the international regime accorded India status parity with the great powers, India chose to follow the rules of the regime and not pursue nuclear weapons. Conversely, when the regime denied India status parity with the great powers, India chose to challenge or break the rules of the regime and pursue nuclear weapons through technology development, testing, and later weaponization. The null hypothesis in this case is that changes in India’s status within the international regime have no impact on India’s thinking and decision-making regarding the bomb and a weapons program.

**Expected Results**

Based on preliminary research, I expect to find distinct phases in India’s nuclear behavior that correspond with changes in the international regime for the control of nuclear weapons. For instance, India’s abstention from the bomb in the 1960s following defeat in the Sino-Indian War of 1962 and China’s first nuclear test of 1964 might be explained by the fact that during the 1960s the international regime was still forming and India could play a major role in it, through the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, for example. India’s subsequent decision to build the bomb—taken in 1971—can be viewed as a result of the coming into force of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), which essentially locked India out of the club of great powers for 25 years. Similarly, India’s decision to conduct a second round of tests in 1995 (eventually 1998) came just months after the permanent extension of the NPT. At each of these critical junctures, I expect to find Indian leaders closely monitoring their country’s status relative to that of the great powers in the international regime, and making decisions based on this calculus. Needless to say, in establishing this connection empirically I aim to carefully evaluate and give adequate weight to the existing alternative explanations laid out above.

**Target Audience/Dissemination Vehicle**

This project is part of a larger dissertation project that studies how the desire for status influences the policies of rising powers in international security regimes, specifically those designed to restrain certain types of weapons and warfare. In the larger project, I examine three cases of rising powers in international security regimes using historical research methods: the United States and the laws of war

---

in the mid-19th century, Japan and naval disarmament in the interwar period (1920s), and India and nuclear non-proliferation in the latter half of the 20th century. The main output therefore will be a book manuscript that I intend to complete by mid-2016 for submission to academic publishers. The book will be useful for scholars and practitioners interested in developing a more nuanced understanding of some of the underlying psychological mechanisms that drive decision-making among rising powers on critical security issues in an international institutional context. This applies not just to multilateral institutions but also bilateral negotiations.

One of the most important insights at this stage that I imagine emerging from this research will be that to many countries—especially rising powers—the form of an international institutional arrangement matters as much as its substantive outcomes. In other words, countries that are not in the top tier of world powers will tend to seek recognition and symbolic equality with the great powers, and if they are denied these goals then they might act to subvert, undermine, or entirely overthrow existing international regimes. In this context, international agreements such as the India-US nuclear agreement of 2005-08 or the recent nuclear deal with Iran can be viewed as durable and successful not just for their strategic outcomes but also because they accord the countries in question a certain level of status in the international regime and world order that is likely to nudge them toward rule following rather than rule breaking in the future. Insights such as these can shape future nuclear cooperation and negotiation between the US and de facto nuclear powers or potential nuclear powers.