Objectives: The global nuclear regime is the culmination of efforts to manage nuclear technology internationally. The original meanings of the treaties that inaugurated the regime, which for interpretive purposes have been identified as the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, which denuclearized Latin America and the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), are rooted in how and why they were first brokered. This book situates these international agreements in their original contexts, most notably the Cold War, decolonization, development and the United Nations. It also advances a historical theory of states’ attitudes toward nuclear weapons and correspondingly proliferation, which holds that a society’s memory of what Philip Bobbitt calls epochal wars and which I style “last wars,” frames how it views the relationship between sovereignty, national security and international order.¹

Overview: The world’s states built a global regime to manage the development and dissemination of nuclear weapons from 1956 to 1975, when climbing sales of nuclear reactors and a drumbeat of nuclear crises at hotspots around the world convinced many that multilateral and international measures were needed to manage the atom. Three nuclear powers—the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom—worked together and within an international community then emerging from decolonization to devise common rules and collective arrangements for nuclear security. Three solutions were identified: a nuclear-test ban, regional pacts to keep nuclear weapons out of certain neighborhoods and a global agreement to forbid new states from acquiring them. The regime they made has outlasted the Cold War and international accord remains bound up in the bargain struck when the world sought to control nuclear science and technology fairly and effectively amid the ruins of empire and under the shadow of thermonuclear war.

My book explains why and how states agreed to create the global nuclear regime in the way in which they did. Two origin myths now prevail, which hold that its architects were preoccupied either with efficacy (nonproliferation first) or with equity (a grand bargain). These readings overlook the myriad political issues on which negotiations turned. Scholars have used various analytical frameworks ranging

¹ Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History (New York: Knopf, 2002). G. John Ikenberry propounds a similar version of state-reformation in the wake of major conflicts albeit with a focus on liberal nation-states in After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). My work builds on these legal-institutional theories by exploring how multilateral pacts are wrought in peacetime, when the last war’s legacies rather than its impacts are most salient.
from structural realism to constructivism to explain the interrelated phenomena that I address: nuclear proliferation, nonproliferation, and deterrence. William Walker detects a ‘logic of restraint’ in Cold War nuclear diplomacy in A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order, explaining these norms and institutions as natural products of enlightened self-interest. My scholarship instead treats them as historical subjects that various actors have contested and circumstances have changed over time. Historians differ in their interpretations as well. An orthodox school associates this golden age of nuclear diplomacy with the advent of US-Soviet détente and a “long peace” brought about by bilateral deterrence combined with global nonproliferation. Shane Maddock, by contrast, maintains that the US always sought a nuclear monopoly. These accounts fail to assign enough significance to how US interests in nuclear security were increasingly global after 1958 or how the rest of the world engaged actively in nuclear diplomacy as well. My work looks beyond US-Soviet interactions to make two interpretive interventions and one theoretical claim:

• First, international nuclear diplomacy was always a contested affair whose outcomes were contingent on political decisions based often on historical and political judgments.

• Second, after 1956, nuclear technology was increasingly global on account of technology transfers via Atoms for Peace. Nuclear security and diplomacy were as well as a result of nuclear crises on the Cold War periphery, Chinese brinksmanship, French assertiveness and Latin American regionalism. These trends and events made postcolonial regions as central to global nuclear affairs as Central Europe.

• Lastly, debates over nuclear rights and obligations were framed according to states’ differing attitudes toward nuclear security and global governance whose characteristics sprang from distinct national memories of the “last war.”

Richard Neustadt and Ernest May have shown how historical analogies inform policymakers’ attitudes and actions. In essence, those who brokered these accords aimed less at halting proliferation than at preventing their last war from recurring. For Cold War rivals, the specter of total nuclear war conjured up the slaughterhouse of the Second World War and the self-immolation of industrial civilization. For

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fading empires and former colonies alike, by contrast, the last war meant colonial conquests, or nationalist uprisings.

These collective memories led to clashing views of nuclear weapons whose military and symbolic power only enriched their political value. For the superpowers, nonproliferation helped underwrite strategic stability by preserving US internationalism and restraining West German nuclear ambitions, respectively, and by supporting the balance of terror for both. For ex-colonies and crumbling empires, nuclear weapons meant diplomatic status and societal progress. This split pointed to distinct standpoints from which states viewed nuclear pacts; hence, those desirous of them brought two coherent sets of ideas to bear in negotiations about how to manage nuclear power: a conservative, discriminatory, hierarchical and force-backed pax atomica; or a world of sovereign equals whose ideals aimed at fairness, equality, universality and world government.

These two visions—one preventive, the other promissory—vied for supremacy in the golden age of international nuclear diplomacy, as a community of nation-states then exiting the colonial era strove to moderate the threat of nuclear weapons in an ever more interconnected world. The regime’s origins thus speak to a larger puzzle of why the existence of nuclear weapons has coincided with a lack of great-power conflict since the Second World War. Political scientists and historians who argue that nuclear weapons have kept the “long peace” neglect how inextricably norms, power and institutions are linked. As former Secretary of State James Baker cautions, “[a]lmost every achievement contains within its success the seeds of a future problem.” In the late-1950s, it was assumed that most militaries would field tactical nuclear weapons within a decade. International cooperation and common rules helped ward off that future. In the 1960s, territorial sovereignty was recognized as the cardinal tenet of postcolonial geopolitics. Yet, preemptive strikes (Iraq 1981, Syria 2007 and Iran 2012) and a preventive war (Iraq 2003) have accompanied (and perhaps even been enabled by) the global nuclear order. My inquiry accordingly comes to a more equivocal verdict: on the one hand, multilateral agreements to curtail the development or dissemination of nuclear weapons have made great-power wars (especially ones fought with nuclear arms) less likely; on the other hand, they have helped legitimate preventive actions waged in the name of nuclear nonproliferation.

**Research Design:** This book builds on years of archival research used to reconstruct why and just as importantly how the global nuclear regime was built at a crucial historical juncture in Cold War and international history. The cast of characters was global, hailing from the communist East and the capitalist West, the Industrial North and the Global South. My study therefore avails itself of sources from seven states (the US, UK, France, Ireland, Mexico, Russia and Canada); four international organizations (NATO, the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, the IAEA and the UN); eyewitness testimony, and the documentary collections made available by the National Security Archive and the Cold War International History Project. A multi-archival, -lingual and -national methodology supports an interpretive framework that integrates how various types of states took part in global

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nuclear diplomacy, letting me retrace how historical attitudes, power and institutions collectively guided how the international community has attended to matters of nuclear war and peace.

**Target Audience and Policy Contributions:** The arguments made in *The Bargain* speak to multiple academic and policy audiences. The book will contribute to existing bodies of literature in the history of US foreign relations, the Cold War and international relations as well as those of IR-theory and political science. A more inclusive account of the global nuclear regime’s origins will also inform contemporary policymakers who work in international nuclear politics. The two origin myths are invoked whenever NPT Preparatory or Review Conferences meet. Clearing up some historical misconceptions could help moderate differences by clarifying the meanings of particular articles, shoring up consensus and thereby strengthening the regime. In addition, a historical theory of nuclear attitudes can offer a new lens through which to evaluate states’ nuclear policies. For example, if my theory is valid, the Iran-Iraq War may be more central to Iranian nuclear thinking than the pursuit of regional hegemony, a desire to counter Israel or fear of a US military intervention.
2. Sameer Lalwani, RAND

Re-examining the Empirical Evidence for “Nuclear Emboldenment”

Objectives

Iran’s advances in nuclear enrichment have renewed interest in understanding how states behave after obtaining nuclear weapons. Some fear nuclear acquisition would embolden Iran and afford it “a defensive shield enabling it to carry out conventional aggression with impunity.”¹ Practitioners and scholars often explicitly base these fears on the case of Pakistan, which after developing nuclear weapons is alleged to have been “emboldened to view its nuclear arsenal as a magic shield”² and “intentionally ratcheted up conflict with India in coordination with proxy groups.”³ My research on South Asian conflicts has led me to suspect, however, that the evidence of nuclear emboldenment in the “critical case” of Pakistan is actually quite weak. This project seeks to test the theory of nuclear emboldenment with a more rigorous approach to research design and more detailed evidence of historic and recent Pakistani security behavior.

Overview

The goal of this project is to clarify what constitutes emboldenment, that is, the “willingness to initiate disputes”⁴ and determine whether it really occurred after Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Much of the literature on this topic alleges a robust link between nuclear weapons and an upsurge in Pakistani conventional and sub-conventional aggression.⁵ However this contention is difficult to evaluate since specific observables of the emboldenment argument are not clearly stipulated, and the empirical evidence from different episodes is loosely referenced or conflated. To correct these problems, I plan to identify a number of testable predictions that are implied by the emboldenment proposition and evaluate whether they actually hold in specific episodes of Pakistan’s conflict history. I suspect problems of continuity, sequencing, non-aggression, and attribution may all challenge this argument.

First, the emboldenment thesis requires nuclear procurement to uniquely produce new forms of aggression or at least a significant increase in such aggression. In fact Pakistani conventional and sub-conventional aggression were routine prior to nuclear acquisition. Pakistan had a long history of

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supporting insurgency throughout India dating back to the 1940s. Material support for neighboring insurgencies was common throughout South Asia in the second half of the twentieth century, often reactively, to either manage the potential externalities of these rebellions or as a tit-for-tat retaliation to exploit a rival’s vulnerabilities.

Second, the emboldenment argument expects that episodes of sub-conventional escalation should follow the nuclear breakthroughs believed to have given the state the requisite insurance to take on such risks. If a close examination of the purported episodes of nuclear emboldenment reveals this risky behavior began prior to the nuclear breakthroughs, it exposes a major hole in the causal story. This is plentiful evidence to indicate Pakistan’s support for sub-conventional actors and execution of tactical aggression actually did begin prior to nuclear procurement and deterrence breakthroughs. Emboldenment proponents might argue the expectation of the nuclear breakthrough motivated these risky choices, but this would depend on fine-grained empirical evidence showing leaders’ confidence in these outcomes.

Third, for the emboldenment argument to hold, it should produce episodes of consistent aggression rather than oscillation between aggression, nonaggression, and deliberate restraint, particularly after major nuclear advances. Many of the nuclear aggression arguments have relied on invariant research designs and ignored variation in the dependent variable, that is, periods when predicted aggression was absent or de-escalated. As described above, there was a broad period of decades when, despite the absence of the treatment (nuclear weapons), Pakistan still exhibited the same value of the dependent variable (sub/conventional aggression). A closer analysis of a narrower temporal band reveals that in the year following Pakistan’s nuclear tests, infiltration and violence in Kashmir inexplicably declined by 30%. Despite a failed sub-conventional maneuver in the Kargil region of Kashmir in 1999, Pakistan avoided escalating conventionally as it had during a similar 1965 operation. After major deterrence success in 2002 and 2008, instead of aggression, Pakistan pursued costly efforts at negotiations and militant crackdowns, which Indian security officials acknowledge had a visible and salutary effect. Emboldenment cannot explain these “dogs that don’t bark” episodes.

Finally, emboldenment proponents implicitly assume states will purposefully make choices to aggress and ratchet up conflict with the expectation that they are immune to the consequences. However, the evidence of attribution and state leaders’ control and deliberate choice in particular episodes of escalation is murky at best. Some, including Indian security officials, have argued that what is counted as aggressive Pakistani behavior may be due to inept decision making processes, atrophying state control, and increasing militant autonomy due to a path dependence and alternative sources of support and patronage. Recent episodes of provocation therefore may not be deliberate choices, and therefore not evidence of emboldenment, even if then may have their origin in past Pakistani actions.

**Hypotheses:** To test the theory of emboldenment, we therefore need to examine richer evidence on past behavior prior to nuclear weapons acquisition, the variation and sequencing in behavior after the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the actual degree of attribution and control a state wields over actions ascribed as evidence of state behavior. The project tests the following hypotheses—a null
hypothesis, an emboldenment hypothesis, and a restraint hypothesis—on the relationship between nuclear weapons and sub-conventional behavior.

**H0:** There is no direct and consistent relationship between nuclear weapons procurement and conventional or sub-conventional aggression.

**H1:** If a state acquires a nuclear deterrent, it will be emboldened and tend to pursue unique, consistent, and deliberate conventional or sub-conventional aggression. This aggression should intensify from periods of nuclear latency to weaponization to deterrence success.

**H2:** If a state acquires a nuclear deterrent, it will be restrained from pursuing conventional or sub-conventional aggression, either due to the expected consequences of heightened retaliation or due to its security demands being satisfied.

Finally, I argue that state support for rebel groups that gets depicted as sub-conventional aggression is primarily reactive and threat driven. This may actually be motivated as much to control and co-opt a rebellion to prevent certain spillover effects. It also may be driven by an opportunity to exploit the vulnerabilities of a threatening, rival state.

**H3:** If a weak state observes the emergence of a rebel group in a neighbor with the potential to trigger negative externalities across its border, it will pursue support that looks like sub-conventional aggression in order to control and co-opt the direction of the rebellion.

**H4:** If a weak state is presented with an opportunity to exploit a vulnerability of a threatening or rival state, it will pursue support that looks like sub-conventional aggression.

**Expected Findings.** I expect to find evidence for the null hypothesis, that emboldenment is not uniquely and consistently a product of nuclear acquisition (H0), and some evidence for restraint with periods of non-aggression or de-escalation of conflict (H2), though I am still uncertain whether nuclear weapons or non-nuclear factors at play in these cases drive restraint. I also expect to find evidence that the motives for sub-conventional aggression are threat-driven and reactive rather than guided by a nuclear umbrella (H3, H4). If I find evidence for these, it would cast serious doubt on any expected post-nuclear emboldenment effect.

**Research Design**

Given the importance of the Pakistani case for the emboldenment thesis, my project is built around thoroughly exploring this case through qualitative analysis using methods of comparison and process tracing. First, to remedy the problems of invariant designs, my project seeks to closely compare Pakistani security behavior and sub-conventional activity pre- and post- nuclear acquisition. Second, it will examine variations in behavior within the post-nuclear period to evaluate the role of nuclear weapons as well as my own hypothesis on threat-driven sub-conventional aggression. Third, it will process trace the sequence of events as well as the decision making, motives, consistency, and degree of control exercised over particularly noteworthy episodes of sub-conventional aggression. I intend to draw on empirical evidence from cases of sub-conventional aggression pre- and post-nuclear acquisition
and fine-grained evidence and chronological data from the more significant sub-conventional aggression cases. My dissertation research on an overlapping topic has afforded me access to a wide range of empirical resources including time-series data from a number of Indian insurgencies, doctrinal publications South Asian militaries, memoirs by a number of pivotal officials, and field interviews from a number of security officials and analysts from both countries.

Target Audience

The target audience of this research is primarily the nuclear security scholarly and policy community. An improved understanding of nuclear acquisition’s relationship to emboldenment can help policymakers make better judgments about the risks of nuclear proliferation, and consequently the “price” they are willing to pay to forestall those costs. Even if the research only reveals an absence of a clear relationship between nuclear weapons and emboldenment in the case of Pakistan, this is still useful. Nuclear scholarship and policy wisdom is guided by such few data points that a shift in the interpretation of one can case be highly consequential.

A second audience for this work may be scholars and practitioners interested in the causes and consequences of middle power security behavior, particularly those potential proliferators with state structures somewhat analogous to Pakistan (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey). Finally, those scholars and practitioners seeking a richer empirical understanding of South Asian security and conflict behavior will find value in this work, for instance, to contextualize broader patterns of Pakistan’s relationships to violent non-state actors.
Conventional Postures after Nuclear Acquisition: The Logic of Nuclear Substitution in South Asia and Beyond

Objectives: Scholars have argued nuclear weapons conceivably allow states to obviate costly conventional arms races. Yet the empirical record of nuclear powers substituting nuclear weapons for conventional build-ups is sparse. In this article, I aim to identify how, if at all, states adjust their conventional postures once they become nuclear powers. I proffer a theory of nuclear substitution, which implies that a nuclear state can decrease its conventional burden and exit welfare-reducing arms races, as long as it meets two conditions. First, its primary security challenge must be a large-scale attack from a state adversary against which nuclear threats are credible. Second, it must be territorially status-quo.

Overview: Scholars are fairly unanimous that there is no defense quite like one predicated on nuclear deterrence (Jervis 1989, Mearsheimer 1984/5, Waltz 2003). Owing to their immense status as defensive weapons, they have argued that nuclear weapons should allow states to unilaterally exit debilitating conventional arms races (Hoag 1961, Glaser 2010). That is, nuclear weapons should be a suitable “substitute” for conventional ones insofar as maintaining one’s security is concerned.

In my research, I proffer a precise theory of nuclear substitution, making explicit its unstated assumptions, logic, and scope conditions. I find that two factors above all determine whether nuclear states, believing their security is guaranteed due to their nuclear status, can decrease their conventional burdens, and thus exit conventional arms races. These factors relate to nuclear states’ ability and willingness to practice nuclear substitution.

First, a nuclear state is able to undergo substitution only if its primary security challenge is a large-scale attack from a state adversary. If a state’s primary threat comes from a domestic insurgency, terrorist or paramilitary organization, or if the state is a potential victim of rapid, forward deployed smaller units of the adversary that can overrun territory or topple a regime or state quickly – threats against which nuclear weapons are not useful – then additional spending on conventional weapons would indeed go a long way. Under such conditions, the state would rely heavily on conventional armaments not just for deterrence but also for defense, and be unlikely to adopt substitution as a strategy.

Related to this concern, if the aforementioned primary threat is a nuclear power – a fair assumption for nuclear-armed state – then the state must enjoy second strike capability against that primary threat. If it does not, it may be a potential victim to a splendid first strike, in which case its conventional forces could make the difference between state survival and death.

Additionally, the threat of nuclear retaliation against both conventional and nuclear attacks must be credible. The issue of credibility is especially paramount in deterring conventional attacks; a state threatening nuclear retaliation against conventional aggression must be certain that such threats are taken seriously. If not, escalation to the nuclear level during a crisis would be dismissed as a bluff, and there would still be a need to ward off potential attacks with conventional arms.
Second, a nuclear state desires to undergo substitution only if it is territorially status-quo. Revisionist states, conversely, are likely to maintain their conventional doctrines or even adjust them upward. This is because the use of nuclear weapons as a shield allows them to pursue their revisionist ends with less potential for blowback or harsh security consequences (Snyder 1965). The ambitions of territorial and political aggrandizement that characterize revisionist states preclude them from arresting conventional build-ups.

For a revisionist state, conventional weaponry plays two distinct roles. Because it is impossible to use nuclear weapons as offensive weapons, conventional weapons are how states take over territory. Attaining a robust and well-developed conventional force is thus crucial to the state’s actual intentions of capturing territory that it does not presently control. Additionally, conventional weapons help deter retaliatory action from the target of revisionism. While nuclear weapons are essentially guaranteed deterrents against large-scale attacks on one’s territory, they do not necessarily deter an adversary from launching conventional attacks to regain territory it was recently dispossessed of. In such a situation, a revisionist state would need a robust conventional capability to dissuade its adversary from striking back heavily on its “own” soil.

I thus expect to find nuclear substitution only under a narrow set of conditions: territorially-satisfied states whose major security threat is a state adversary against which nuclear threats are credible. This deductive logic leads to the following hypotheses:

**H1:** A nuclear power which faces prominent security threats from non-state or highly mobile adversaries will not adjust its conventional posture upon nuclear acquisition.

**H2:** A nuclear power which faces a (nuclear) state adversary against which nuclear threats are not credible will not adjust its conventional posture upon nuclear acquisition.

**H3:** A nuclear power that has territorially revisionist aims will not adjust its conventional posture upon nuclear acquisition.

**H4:** A nuclear state facing economic problems is more likely to adjust its conventional posture than those that do not.

The null hypothesis for the first two hypotheses above is that the precise nature and type of a nuclear state’s security challenges have no bearing on whether it chooses to substitute. The null hypothesis for the third hypothesis is that revisionist and status-quo states should be equally likely to practice nuclear substitution. The null hypothesis for the fourth hypothesis is that nuclear substitution is unrelated to economic considerations, and is purely driven by security variables.

**Research design:** This is a mixed-methods project, involving the use of data on military expenditures, arms procurements, and qualitative case-studies of states’ conventional postures before and after nuclear acquisition. Thus far, I have used historical evidence drawn from Pakistan, China, Israel, the Soviet Union, and the United States to test the argument. Consistent with the theory’s expectations, I
find that states that are revisionist, such as Pakistan or the Soviet Union, or face security threats other than large-scale assault, such as Israel, do not substitute.

The next step in this project is testing the theory’s predictions with evidence drawn from Britain, France, India, and North Korea. The cases are “different” in that they are acknowledged by scholars to have pursued nuclear weapons for reasons other than security first and foremost (Sagan 1996/97). I plan to systematically collate each of these nuclear states’ conventional postures before and after nuclear acquisition, representing the first such data-collection effort. My final research product will be a pair of articles.

**Target audience and policy contributions:** The primary audience for this project is international relations/security studies scholars. In addition, I hope to engage with policymakers and leaders focused on nuclear security, as well as the classic guns-butter trade-off.

The most significant policy implication of this work is the birth of a novel argument that, first, shows that nuclear weapons buy a state significant marginal security only under a narrow range of conditions; states in possession of the bomb continue to buy guns and tanks. Given these findings, policymakers can make stronger arguments against proliferation that appeal to states’ instrumental, rather than just norm-based, interests. If we have valid theoretical and historical reasons to believe that nuclear weapons’ security effects are limited, then non-proliferators’ job becomes easier.

Additionally, this research has implications for the debate on the stability-instability paradox in South Asia (Kapur 2008, Kapur 2009, Krepon 2005), which has tended to cast the introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia as an independent cause of Pakistani revisionism over Kashmir. By contrast, I argue that the stability-instability paradox framework, borrowed from the Cold War, is not especially well-suited to South Asia, primarily because in the former case power politics was at the heart of the dispute, while in the latter, territorial revisionism itself explains the rivalry. Thus, evidence of Pakistan aggressing in Kashmir does not constitute evidence of the existence of the stability-instability paradox per se, because Pakistan’s behavior is not a sharp departure from its actions in its pre-nuclear period.

Finally, with respect to Iran, my research suggests that we should expect adverse security consequences from Iran’s nuclearization only to the extent that it is a revisionist state. If Iran is territorially dissatisfied, we could expect Iran use its nuclear weapons as a shield to deter retaliatory action against its territorial aggrandizement, much the way Pakistan has done so. On the other hand, if observers believe that Iran is territorially satisfied, then a nuclear Iran does not represent a significantly more severe security threat than it currently is.